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Abstract
We present methods for optimizing standardized cryptographic message protocols for
use on disadvantaged network links. We first provide an assessment of current secure
communication message packing standards and their relevance to disadvantaged net-
works. Then we offer methods to reduce message overhead in packing Cryptographic
Message Syntax (CMS) structures by using ZLIB compression and using a Lite version
of CMS. Finally, we offer a few extensions to the Extensible Messaging and Presence
Protocol (XMPP) to wrap secure group messages for chat on disadvantaged networks
and to reduce XMPP message overhead in secure group transmissions. We present
the design and implementation of these optimizations and the results that these op-
timizations have on message overhead, extensibility, and usability of both CMS and
XMPP. We have developed these methods to extend CMS and XMPP with the ul-
timate goal of establishing standards for securing communications in disadvantaged
networks.
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Introduction
1.1 Motivation
The Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) and other standards organizations have
recently defined standards for cryptographic message formats to be used for securing
communications in computer networks [8]. These standards focus on addressing in-
teroperability and extensibility issues; they have predominantly been driven by the
needs of terrestrial networks. Little or no consideration has been given to mobile,
wireless networks, whose links maybe constrained in their communication capacities
and connectivity.
At the same time, the use and importance of mobile, wireless networks has been
growing due to smartphones, mobile devices capable of ad-hoc networking, and the
general trend of networking on-the-go.
In the national defense sector, the Department of Defense is pursuing a trans-
formational vision, called Network-Centric Operations (NCO) [8]. The tenets of the
NCO vision express the idea that a robustly inter-networked force improves infor-
mation sharing and collaboration, which ultimately lead to a dramatic increase in
mission effectiveness. Much of forward deployed force will be connected via mobile,
wireless networks, which in the defense sector are known as tactical networks. Tacti-
cal networks are also known as disadvantaged networks because they are often made
up of communication links that are low-bandwidth, high-latency, and intermittent.
This thesis is motivated by these two trends and considers the problem of using
and adapting standard cryptographic message formats for the use in disadvantaged
networks. In addition, this thesis is contributing to a specific effort at MIT Lin-
coln Laboratory. This effort, called Dynamic Group Keying (DGK), is developing
solutions for securing communication and applications in tactical networks, and in
particular, group-oriented applications, such as those that involve information sharing
and collaboration. The ultimate goal of DGK is to standardize its solutions for the use
in tactical networks and, outside the defense sector, in general mobile, wireless net-
works. A step towards this goal is to define solutions proposed by DGK atop existing
and accepted standards, and in particular, atop accepted standards for cryptographic
messages. But in order to maintain relevance to tactical, disadvantaged networks,
the underlying standards need to be optimized for the use on such networks.
1.2 Thesis Overview
Therefore, in this thesis, we investigate methods for optimizing and implementing
standardized cryptographic message formats for use in disadvantaged networks. We
first provide an assessment of the current standards and their relevance to disad-
vantaged networks. Then, we offer methods to reduce message overhead in packing
Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) [35] structures by using ZLIB compression
and investigate a possibility of creating a Lite version of CMS. Finally, we offer a few
extensions to the Extensible Messaging and Presence Protocol (XMPP) [52]: one -
to secure group chat messages on disadvantaged networks, and the other - to reduce
XMPP message overhead in secure group transmissions.
We present the design, implementation, and results that these optimizations have
on message overhead, extensibility, and usability of both CMS and XMPP. We have
developed these optimizations to extend CMS and XMPP to support the ultimate
goal of eventually establishing a standard for the use of these optimizations in disad-
vantaged networks.
1.2.1 Roadmap
This thesis is separated into two distinct parts. The first part deals with finding
a standard for cryptographic message packing and with the optimizations to that
standard for disadvantaged networks. The second part is a self-contained section that
deals with applications of secure group communications. It describes an extension and
optimization to XMPP in order to support secure group messages.
In Chapter 2, we begin with the standards organizations and evaluate the stan-
dards currently used for cryptographic message packaging. As the result, we choose
to focus on Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) [35] as the target of our optimiza-
tions for its use in disadvantaged networks. Consequently, in Chapter 3, we overview
CMS and its advantages and disadvantages. Chapter 4 describes the design of two
optimizations to reduce CMS messages size: ZLIB compression and a CMS Lite ap-
proach. Chapter 5 covers the implementation of these optimizations in OpenSSL [13],
and Chapter 6 offers an evaluation of these two optimizations against each other.
As mentioned above, Chapter 7 is a self-contained description of the design and
implementation of a group end-to-end encryption protocol extension to enable secure
group communications in XMPP. It also includes the design and implementation of
subset addressing, an optimization to XMPP group chat protocol. These extensions
constitute another example of optimizing a message packaging standard for secure
group communications.
Chapter 8 concludes the thesis and details further work.
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Chapter 2
Standards Options
In the Introduction we discussed our motivation for this project and gave an overview
of the thesis. We discussed our desire to use standardized communications for secure
group communications in disadvantaged networks. However, we must understand
what standards are relevant to secure group communications before we choose one
and optimize it for disadvantaged networks.
In order to understand which standardized messaging protocol is right for us, we
must learn which organizations currently standardize internet protocols and security
mechanisms. There are several major players in the development of computer security
standards.
" The National Security Agency creates guidance for the government on informa-
tion assurance and has several security standards profiles which it recommends
for interoperability among government assets.
" RSA Security defined and maintains the packaging and API for wrapping pub-
lic key certificates and associated data necessary for asymmetric encryption,
called Public Key Cryptography Standards (PKCS) [39]. For security mech-
anisms that use Public Key Cryptography, this standard defines how PKCS
implementations interoperate with one another.
" The Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) specializes in devel-
oping industry-wide standards. Wireless networking and networking standards
were all developed by IEEE. In relation to key management, IEEE Group 1619.3
focuses on key management issues.
While these three organizations all publish standards, for this project we focus on
the following organizations:
" the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF),
" the Organization for Advancement of Structured Information Standards (OA-
SIS),
" the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST).
These three organizations have been involved in the creation of Internet standards
related to communications and security and have open collaboration in creating new
standards. Both of these qualities make them attractive to our project.
2.1 IETF
2.1.1 Area of Expertise
The IETF accepts Requests for Comments (RFCs) which specify how to perform
tasks on the Internet and which promote the operation of the Internet. Usually these
standards are a best common practice. These standards are subject to update when-
ever a better way of performing the same task has been identified. Some important
RFCs which have been developed by the IETF are the Simple Mail Transport Protocol
(SMTP) to send e-mail [41], the Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) [31] providing
how to load and view web-pages, the Security Architecture for IP (IPSec) tunneling
protocol, which enables security mechanisms for Internet traffic at the IP level [40],
and Transport Layer Security (TLS), which provides privacy and data integrity over a
transport protocol, traditionally HTTP [30]. An RFC that relates to our project is the
specification for Secure Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions (S/MIME) [47], which
describes how to use public key encryption and signing of mail-formatted messages.
Another is the Cryptographic Message Syntax described in RFC 3852 [35]. It defines
how to package cryptographically protected messages and is specified to be used in
S/MIME encryption. The NSA has been known to adopt technology standardized by
the IETF.
2.1.2 Process to Create Standards
A proposed standard must go through several states in order to become a full stan-
dard in the IETF [26]. First, the specification must be stable and contain no omis-
sions. An implementation of the specification is generally desired in order to test the
specification. This state is called a proposed standard. When separate interoperable
implementations with different code bases have been created for a proposed standard,
and there has been some operational use of the standards, then the standard may
advance to draft status. A working group in the IETF reviews the draft standard
and it may become a full standard when it is accepted as beneficial to the Internet
by the general community. An experimental standard may be submitted to the IETF
in relation to research efforts [27]. These may be changed into proposed standards if
they are seen as beneficial and stable by the RFC Editor.
2.2 OASIS
2.2.1 Area of Expertise
The OASIS organization is a collection of companies and organizations that develops
open standards for global information needs. The organization focuses on web secu-
rity and e-business standards. Most of their standards are based on the eXtensible
Markup Language (XML). A couple of the relevant standards created by OASIS are
the Web Services Security Specification (WS-Security), which is a means to apply
public key security to Simple Object Access Protocol (SOAP) messages [23] and the
standard for Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) [50], which specifies how
to send encryption and security related information in an XML stream. Many of the
technologies standardized by OASIS, including WS-Security, underlie and are used in
the Department of Defenses Network Centric Enterprise Services.
2.2.2 Process to Create Standards
A new standard must be submitted to a technical committee in order to be consid-
ered for standardization. Technical Committees consist of members from industry.
Technical Committees edit the submission to produce a standard draft and submit
it to a public review. If over half of the present Technical Committee members vote
for the standard, the standard becomes a Committee Specification. Then all OASIS
members comment and then vote on the standard and require greater than a 2/3 vote
for the specification and less than 1/4 vote against it in order for the specification to
become an OASIS Standard.
2.3 NIST
2.3.1 Area of Expertise
The National Institute of Standards and Technology develops many standards in
many different disciplines of engineering. In computer security, NIST standardized
the Data Encryption Standard algorithm in the 1970s and the Advanced Encryption
Standard algorithm in 2002 used to encrypt and decrypt data from shared symmetric
keys. NIST has not specified any new cryptographic message packing standards lately,
instead relying on organizations like the IETF, OASIS, and IEEE to develop them.
2.3.2 Process to Create Standards
Standards are submitted to NIST and are approved in publications called Federal
Information Processing Standards (FIPS) publications. NIST requests papers when
a standard is needed and reviews all submissions before selecting one to make a
standard.
2.4 Related Work
There has been a lot of work done in creating standards used for the storage and
transport of cryptographic information. They build upon previous specifications for
WS-Security, encryption information packaging schemes, like S/MIME encryption,
and cryptographic information messaging standards like the Cryptographic Message
Syntax (CMS) [47][35].
2.4.1 Key Management
Key management lately has become an important issue given the number of dis-
parate applications and devices. In order to protect the data in these applications
and devices from malicious users, encryption and data signing are necessary. To
accomplish this goal, standard ways of managing keys across applications and plat-
form are needed [33]. Several efforts are being made by the standards organizations
mentioned earlier to accomplish this goal.
2.4.2 Enterprise Key Management Infrastructure
OASIS has created the Enterprise Key Management Infrastructure Technical Commit-
tee in response to the need for standardized key management. The EKMI Technical
Committee is involved in developing a Symmetric Key Services Markup Language for
key transport. These specifications use XML to provide a standardized mechanism
for symmetric key transport.
2.4.3 Guidelines for Cryptographic Key Management
In response to the need for key management, the IETF published RFC 4107 [25].
The specification guidelines on when automated key management should be used and
when it is sufficient to manually manage the keys needed in encryption. According
to the specification, automated key management should be used when the number
of keys needed is n2 where n is the number of users, or if using a symmetric stream
cipher, similar initialization vectors, sending large amounts of data in a short time,
or using a key needed by more than two parties. Thus, according to RFC 4107,
automated key management is important to support in any cryptographic message
packing standard.
2.5 Recent Operational Standards
We now look at the current security standards defined by the organizations men-
tioned above. The following standards have been created to transport and package
cryptographic messages: The S/MIME Encryption Standard, Cryptographic Message
Syntax, and Web Services Security standard.
2.5.1 S/MIME Encryption
S/MIME encryption was developed as a way of protecting Multipurpose Internet
Mail Extensions (MIME) data with the PKCS 7 secure message format [39]. MIME
data format was specified by the IETF and used generally for e-mail messages. The
PKCS 7 algorithm and packaging format was generated by RSA Data Security. The
specification was changed to use the CMS format, which is very similar to PKCS
7. The S/MIME specification details how to package MIME-type data and specifies
how to encrypt and decrypt these packaged messages. S/MIME messages can be
encrypted to multiple recipients using their public keys, providing a way to securely
share data with a group of participants [39].
2.5.2 CMS Message Formatting
The Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) is similar to PKCS 7 as described above
and is used to digitally sign, digest, authenticate and/or encrypt arbitrary message
data [35]. Data in an S/MIME message is formatted according to CMS. The CMS
RFC 3852 defines data structures which hold information on keys and the encapsu-
lated data along with digests and other properties needed to implement public key
encryption and digital signing and message digests. It may be possible to extend
CMS to encapsulate the types of secure group communications being developed at
MIT Lincoln Laboratories. Cryptlib [1] and OpenSSL [13] are examples of the soft-
ware libraries that implement a subset of CMS.
2.5.3 Web Services Security (WS-Security)
WS-Security standards also define a method to send authentication data needed for
public key cryptography [16]. The difference between the CMS format and Web
service security format is that CMS defines a format which can be laid out bitwise
on a transfer medium. CMS messages also can be encoded in several formats for
transfer. In contrast, WS-Security specifies how to secure Simple Object Access
Protocol (SOAP) [23] messages in XML. An XML security token format inside a
SOAP message defines the authentication information stored within a secured SOAP
message. The XML encoding therefore must be used by WS-Security. WSS4J [17]
coded by the Apache project [11] is an open-source implementation of WS-Security.
SOAP messages using WS-Security could also become the message packaging standard
for secure group communications in disadvantaged networks.
2.6 The Choice... and Why
We chose the Cryptographic Message Syntax as the standard on which to focus to
develop optimizations for disadvantaged networks. We chose this message standard
for several reasons:
" CMS is widely used in the security community. There are many different exten-
sions to CMS, and it supports a wide variety of algorithms and configurations.
* CMS is used in the most commonly used group security protocol, S/MIME [47].
* CMS is also more compact than WS-Security in its native form, which uses
base-64 encoded structures and human-readable XML elements, while CMS
uses ASN.1 structures which can be encoded in many ways, to reduce message
size.
" CMS has almost become the de-facto basis for sending cryptographic messages
in IETF. Applications such as certificate management already use CMS [53].
* OpenSSL, which is used in related work at Lincoln Laboratories, has backported
support for CMS.
" CMS has a diverse RFC author distribution, with around 30 contributors and
over 30 related RFCs.
We next describe CMS in much greater detail and then we show our design for
optimizing CMS for disadvantaged networks.
Chapter 3
Cryptographic Message Syntax
In the previous chapter we selected Cryptographic Message Syntax as a message
syntax standard on which to focus our optimizations for disadvantaged networks and
offered our reasoning behind that choice. In this chapter we describe CMS in greater
detail. First we discuss the original purpose of CMS and its history and current
usage. We also examine some of the message structures and types in CMS and their
use in securing and authenticating data. Finally, we describe the advantages and
disadvantages that CMS presents in the context of disadvantaged networks.
3.1 Purpose and History
CMS is defined in the IETF RFC 3852 [35]. CMS grew out of another standard
developed by RSA Laboratories, called PKCS 7 version 1.5 [39], for packaging cryp-
tographic data being sent over electronic mail. The PKCS 7 syntax was made to be
easily convertible into Privacy-Enhanced Mail (PEM) [42]. The PKCS 7 syntax was
adopted, developed, and maintained by the IETF after its initial development. CMS
was developed to encapsulate and protect data transferred over the Internet. The
syntax can support digital signatures, digests, key transport, and encrypted message
content. The structures and values in CMS are generated using ASN.1 with basic en-
coding rules and are typically represented as octet-strings [21]. Since its creation, in
RFC 3369, CMS was modified to add mechanisms to support more key management
schemes and separate the cryptographic algorithms used by the message structure
from the makeup of the structure itself [34]. CMS was then later extended by RFC
3852 to support different certificate formats and revocation list formats [35].
3.2 Usage
We now consider the applications of CMS. CMS has become the IETF de-facto stan-
dard for cryptographic material transmission, so many related cryptographic protocols
generated by the IETF use CMS. The typical usage for CMS has been in S/MIME
secure e-mail messaging [47]. This technology provides authentication, message in-
tegrity checking, non-repudiation, privacy, and data security to any MIME data [32],
and is not limited to just e-mail messages. It can protect MIME encoded data sent
via HTTP [31] or other protocols. In S/MIME, enveloped CMS messages are created
to provide data security and privacy functions, while signed and authenticated CMS
structures are used to provide integrity, non-repudiation, and authentication. Due to
the flexibility of CMS, new algorithms for key management, key wrapping, signing,
and encrypting data in CMS are easily supported without requiring changes to the
base CMS structure.
We have already seen several follow-on RFCs which relate to CMS. RFC 2797
[43] established a method of passing Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) [46] information
through the use of CMS messages. The protocol describes an interface to exchange
certificates. Requests for certificates are first made using PKCS 10 objects. Then,
responses to requests for certificates are created using signed CMS structures. This
protocol is then later updated in RFC 5272 through 5275. In RFC 5272, PKI requests
and responses are both wrapped in CMS structures [54]. RFC 5273 provides file
extensions which correspond to PKI requests and responses and methods to use PKI
requests and responses encapsulated in MIME data, HTTP/HTTPS [31] protocol
data, and TCP-based data [55]. RFC 5274 deals with terminology [53] and RFC 5275
describes a symmetric key management protocol and architecture. The symmetric
key management protocol is created using PKI Requests/Responses encapsulated by
CMS enveloped or signed structures [56]. RFC 4108 describes the use of CMS to
protect firmware packages in transmission [36].
As the reader may see, CMS is quickly evolving and growing to enable cryptog-
raphy on the Internet. The open source cryptography library, OpenSSL has even
included CMS into its message packaging [13]. Also, it is fairly easy to incorporate
new algorithms into CMS, potentially including those used by Lincoln Laboratory's
secure group communications project. This makes CMS an appropriate standard to
focus on in developing optimizations for disadvantaged networks.
3.3 Message Structures
Having described the different applications of CMS, we now consider the content and
syntax of CMS messages. The structure of CMS is fairly simple, but looks drastically
different depending on the type of message.
CMS Structure
choose one
version contentTypel
Figure 3-1: A CMS message: the content type defines the structure of the rest of the
message
..... . . ..... . . . .. .
The top level element in every CMS message is the ContentInf o element, which
simply contains the version number of the CMS structure followed by an object which
defines the content type of the structure. This content type defines the data as a CMS
structure and informs anyone processing the data what to expect next. All elements
in the CMS structure are defined as ASN.1 objects and thus can be encoded/decoded
just like any other ASN.1 objects [35]. Figure 3-1 shows the top level structure.
There are several different content types available in CMS:
SignedData, EnvelopedData, DigestedData, EncryptedData, AuthenticatedData,
Data, and CompressedData. More content types can be added to CMS by writing
a new RFC to update CMS. In general, the content types all permit an entity to
process the content in a single pass using Basic Encoding Rules (BER) [21].
SignedData takes arbitrary encapsulated content and applies an arbitrary num-
ber of signers to the content. Usually SignedData transmits digital signatures or
PKI information that needs to be transmitted with integrity and authentication [46].
EnvelopedData content encrypts the content of the package with a content encryption
key (CEK). This key is then wrapped via a specified algorithm to any number of re-
cipients. This data type is typically used to digitally envelope data in schemes such as
S/MIME [47]. The DigestedData type simply consists of any type of content which
includes a message integrity digest calculated with a specified algorithm. The digest
is computed only on the content of the structure and a recipient can verify the content
by independently calculating a digest with the same algorithm on the same content
that the message contains. EncryptedData is similar to enveloped data except there
is no CEK included in the package. Key management with EncryptedData packages
must be done through some other means. AuthenticatedData encrypts a message
authentication key to any number of recipients, which is used to verify a message
authentication code made from the content of the package as well as any other at-
tributes that the user chooses to authenticate. Finally, Data content in CMS usually
encapsulates arbitrary data being sent over the wire and itself is usually encapsulated
by other CMS content types.
3.3.1 Encapsulation
One of the main concepts in CMS is encapsulation. An unlimited number of types of
structures can be made by creating one type of CMS structure and then encapsulating
it in another. For example, let's say that you wanted to take a text file and sign, then
encrypt it in CMS for transmission to another entity. First, the text file would be
described by Data content, which is essentially an octet-stream. This data content
would then be encapsulated in a SignedData structure where the signature would
verify the ASCII text encoded in the octet-stream. Finally, the whole SignedData
structure would be encapsulated in an EnvelopedData structure, which would have
CEKs for all recipients of the data. Encapsulation allows data to have multiple
attributes and many cryptographic operations completed on the same piece of data
in large nested CMS structure. Applications can process CMS structures until they
reach a point where they do not have the necessary permissions to view further, and
chains of signatures or encrypted packages can be created to ensure confidentiality of
a message or authentication by multiple entities. The structure therefore, integrates
very well into PKI.
3.3.2 Used Content Types
The main content types in CMS are the EnvelopedData content type and SignedData
content type. EnvelopedData can be used for encrypting information while includ-
ing in the same package the content encryption key needed to decrypt the message.
This content encryption key can be encrypted to multiple recipients via several key
management schemes. This makes EnvelopedData a flexible structure for encryption.
SignedData is used for date authentication. Also, as discussed in 3.2, PKI requests
and responses use SignedData packages in order to authenticate certificates and other
PKI information. Let's look in more detail at these two structures.
CMS Enveloped Data
Figure 3-2: EnvelopedData structure laid out in memory.
3.3.3 Enveloped Messages
EnvelopedData contains encrypted content, optional certificates or certificate revo-
cation lists, and unprotected attributes attached to the structure on the top level.
All key management is done in the RecipientInf o set of data elements. There is one
RecipientInfo for every entity the message is encrypted to. Each contains the key
which encrypts the message content, which itself is encrypted according to a specified
key management scheme.
3.3.4 Signed Messages
CMS SignedData
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Version Signer ID digestAig Signed Attr Sig Aig Unsigned Attr
Figure 3-3: SignedData structure laid out in memory.
SignedData at the top level contains the encapsulated content, attributes, a list
of digest algorithms used by the structure, and optional certificates or revocation
lists. All the signatures are contained in SignerInfo elements. One SignerInfo
is created for each signature added to the structure. These elements also contain
optional signed attributes as well as specifiers for the digest and signature algorithms
used in the signature.
3.4 CMS Usage in Disadvantaged Networks
CMS can be used in disadvantaged networks to package secure communications. The
EnvelopedData structure could be used to encrypt messages to groups of entities while
the SignedData structure could be used to send authenticated information over the
networks. CMS has an advantage in in that it is generic and descriptive. These char-
acteristics allow it to support many different types of algorithms and content types.
New algorithms are supported easily using the CMS syntax, making it extensible.
This is an advantage since new encryption algorithms may need to be developed for
use on disadvantaged networks. Also, since CMS requires no specific transfer method
or lower level details, it is interoperable. However, a disadvantage with CMS is that
these structures can add a significant amount of message size overhead. In this thesis
we investigate and propose methods for how to reduce this overhead.
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Chapter 4
Optimizing CMS for
Disadvantaged Networks
In the previous chapter we examined Cryptographic Message Syntax in detail, focus-
ing on a couple of message structures within the syntax, the EnvelopedData type
and the SignedData type. These message types can be considered the main ones
in CMS and they are useful in packaging group secure information in the Lincoln
Laboratory Dynamic Group Keying project. However, there are significant problems
toward adopting CMS as the standard for packaging group data in disadvantaged
networks. First, CMS must have a method for supporting the algorithms which are
used in disadvantaged networks. Second, CMS must not introduce too much overhead
data into each message. This is because a disadvantaged network can not reliably
send large quantities of data quickly. Bandwidth, latency, and connectivity may all
be limited in a disadvantaged network.
In this chapter, we present strategies for eliminating overhead when sending CMS-
packaged data. We first determine our methods of evaluating CMS and any optimiza-
tions we develop. Then we look into the sources of overhead in CMS. Finally we delve
into the potential methods of reducing this overhead and explain the advantages and
disadvantages of each method.
4.1 Methods of Evaluation
There are several ways of evaluating the efficiency of a cryptographic message packing
method. Two of the different methods are listed below:
" Computations: Estimates the number of computations that the processor
would have to make in order to create the message.
" Message Size: Evaluates the overall efficiency of a structure based on the
amount of data that is sent from entity to entity.
We chose to evaluate the efficiency of Cryptographic Message Syntax based on the
message size of the syntax. We assume that the computation power needed to encrypt,
decrypt, sign, and create mesages would cause delays far less than the delays caused
by the latency and bandwidth of the disadvantaged networks that send that data.
This is because our environment may include links with less than 4096 bits/sec, while
the links may connect computers that have 2 or more cores operating at greater than
2GHz. Also, the power required for communications is generally greater than that
required for computations. Thus, processor cycles can be relatively free compared to
bandwidth on the network.
4.2 Sources of Overhead in CMS
This section details the sources of overhead in the CMS structure. The documentation
for CMS shows how the structure is laid out, but does not tell us much about how
large each structure is. These questions can be answered through some testing. We
ran a few initial tests on simple CMS structures with varying byte payloads which
showed where the sources of overhead were. Figure 4-1 shows the sizes of sample
EnvelopedData and SignedData structures as they would appear in transmission
between two entities. Figure 4-2 then shows the CMS overhead data in each of these
messages.
There are several options available to create an EnvelopedData package. In
OpenSSL, CMS structures can pack data using either binary data or text format.
CMS payload to structure size
Figure 4-1: EnvelopedData with AES-256-cbc CEKs and 2048 bit RSA encryption
keys with differing payloads
They also can have many different types of encryption and include attributes that
are signed, encrypted, or unmodified. Certificates and CRLs can be added to the
structure as well. For our purposes, we use binary data since CMS by default does
not package data in text format. As a default, in our test EnvelopedData we encrypt
a message with 1 byte of payload to one user. We use a CEK which is encrypted to
each user with RSA Encryption [49] using X.509 certificates [37] and 2048 bit keys.
The CEK encrypts the packaged data with an AES 256-bit cipher [44].
Our SignedData packages have 1 signer using an RSA X.509 certificate to digitally
sign the encapsulated data. The package has a 1 byte payload of binary data again
with no signed attributes or S/MIME Capabilities and no certificates attached so we
can look at the bare minimum SignedData package.
As you can see in 4-1, for only 1 byte of payload, there is a considerable amount of
overhead, 450 bytes of CMS-related data. However, as the size of the data increases,
the overhead related to the CMS structure stays the same, which results in a linear
increase in CMS package size with a linear increase in payload size. The CMS overhead
remains fixed no matter the payload. This makes sense since the package does not
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Figure 4-2: EnvelopedData overhead without payloads included
depend on the data included in the package.
In Table 4.1 we show the size breakdown for each CMS component.
EnvelopedData SignedData
version 2 version 2
contentType 6 contentType 6
recipientInfo 377 signerInfo 375
encryptedContentInfo 73 encapContentInfo 18
algorithms 9
Table 4.1: EnvelopedData and SignedData message breakdown
We can see that most of the overhead in the CMS package comes from the
RecipientInf o structure and the EncryptedContent Inf o structure. In the SignedData
structure, most of the CMS-related overhead is in the SignerInfo package. The
RecipientInf o and SignerInf o structures are largest because they contain the vari-
able CEK and signature. The signature algorithms and content specifiers are fixed
data structures and are relatively small. We also show the size breakdown for each
structure when we eliminate the data accounted for by the CEK or signature. The
overhead in the RecipientInf o and SignerInf o structures still outweighs the over-
head outside these structures.
4.2.1 Specification of Algorithms
One of the sources of overhead is in the specification of algorithms in both of these
data structures. SignedData has a set of digest algorithms specified in the top level
so that a processing program can determine if it supports all the digest algorithms
used in the set of SignerInf o structures. Each SignerInf o corresponds to one
signature. Thus each SignerInfo has a signature and digest algorithm specified.
Each digest algorithm takes around 10 bytes of space in the structure. Each signature
algorithm takes about 10 bytes of space as well. In the EnvelopedData structure,
the EncryptedContentInfo specifies an encryption algorithm which uses 10 bytes of
space, and more if initialization vectors (IVs) are needed, like the IV needed by AES
in cipher block chaining mode [44]. For each recipient the CEK encryption algorithm
is specified through one of the key management methods.
4.2.2 Content Encryption Keys
Much of the extra data in CMS packages is used by the CEK sent to each recipient of
an encrypted package. This extra data is not overhead because it is needed to decrypt
the encapsulated content. The more recipients that an EnvelopedData structure has,
the more CEKs that will be generated when using S/MIME. This is because S/MIME
dictates that a CEK be sent to each recipient separately so that each recipient can
use his own private key to decrypt the data.
The most expensive (in size) method of key management in CMS is the Key Trans-
port mode where X.509 public keys are used to encrypt the CEK separately to each
recipient. These keys are generally large since they are asymmetric keys (2048 bits or
greater). In the other key management schemes, Key Agreement, Password, and Key
Encryption Key, the content encryption keys are smaller as they use symmetric keys.
4.2.3 Formatting and Encoding
CMS uses ASN.1 structures [21] in order to describe all of its elements. ASN.1 struc-
tures offer flexibility in how a piece of data is represented and in how the structure can
be encoded to pass to other entities. The normal encoding for CMS is Basic Encoding
Rules (BER). This encoding has two subsets, Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and
Distinguished Encoding Rules (DER). BER encoding defines each data element as a
type identifier, a length description, and then the actual data content which may be
ended by an end-of-content marker. This format allows a receiver to obtain the nec-
essary information about a data element without any pre-existing knowledge about
the structure and without the full stream of data. The CMS data may also be DER
encoded, which differs from BER only in that the length specifications for each value
must be made in one way; i.e., no end-of-content marker exists.
4.2.4 Optional Data
Finally the multitude of optional items in CMS structures can add much extra data to
the package. These options are included in CMS to support situations when no form
of key management infrastructure are in place or when the sender wants the receiver
to be able to use the CMS messages without any other outside information, or to
transport authentication material such as certificates and certificate revocation lists.
For example, in the EnvelopedData structure, the sender may include information
about itself including certificates which may be necessary to verify signatures.
The structure also allows for an undetermined number of unprotected attributes.
The SIGNEDDATA structure supports optional signed and unsigned attributes for each
signature as well as certificates or certificate revocation lists. All these options add
extra data to the CMS structure, but are not mandatory for the base functionality
of CMS.
4.2.5 Potential Solutions
As mentioned in 4.2 the major sources of overhead in the CMS package are generally
from specifying algorithms, formatting and encoding the data, adding cryptographic
material necessary to sign and/or encrypt the encapsulated data, and allowing for
flexibility by providing means to add optional data such as timestamps, certificates,
and certificate revocation lists. Solutions to the overhead problem must be able to
recreate CMS structures without disturbing the integrity of the data or fundamentally
altering the algorithms and methods necessary to perform cryptographic operations
on the data.
4.3 Requirements
There are several requirements to any solution which attempts to reduce overhead in
CMS.
1. Recoverable
When a CMS package is transformed in order to reduce its overhead, the package
should then be able to be completely restored to its original state. This is the
most important rule as our encryption, signing, and authentication will not
work without this guarantee.
2. Flexible
Any solution should work with the main structures available in CMS. Also, al-
gorithms which are supported by CMS should continue to be supported by the
solution. Variable numbers of recipients and signers should also be supported.
While not all algorithms need to be supported, a solution should enable the
passing of cryptographic data associated with different algorithms. For exam-
ple, AES with cipher block chaining requires initialization vectors and Diffie-
Hellman algorithms require passing of public information.
3. Extensible
When the CMS structure is extended via RFCs, minimal effort should have to
be made to make the solution support the new changes. From the past 10 years
there are 55 RFCs with CMS in the title. This means that the syntax is being
changed as it finds new uses and one of its strengths is its extensibility. Our
changes should take this strength into account.
4. Simple
The more complexity involved in creating a solution to reduce overhead, the
more opportunity for error the solution can provide.
With these thoughts in mind, we attempted to find and evaluate a few solutions to
reduce the overhead introduced by CMS.
4.4 General Purpose Compression to Reduce Over-
head: ZLIB
In the previous sections, we described the sources of overhead in a CMS structure.
This section details one potential solution which will reduce the size of a CMS struc-
ture. Here we propose using ZLIB [29] compression on the CMS structure in order
to reduce its overhead. We then detail our thoughts on how to best compress CMS
structures.
4.4.1 ZLIB Overview
ZLIB is an algorithm that provides lossless compression [29]. It is an open standard
with free source code, and was already used in libraries we depend on, like OpenSSL.
Let us look at the inner workings of ZLIB so we can understand how it applies to
compressing CMS.
Background
ZLIB was developed as a lossless compression format that would be
" Independent of the other parts of the system it was used on, including CPU,
operating system, file system, etc.;
" Efficient in compressing data compared to the best compression algorithms;
" Free from patents so the algorithm could be used freely;
* Usable with the previously developed gzip file format [29].
The Structure
A ZLIB encoded structure is described by a series of blocks which correspond to
substrings of the data. Each of the block sizes have variable length under 65535
bytes. Each block compressed into literal strings with distance pairs using LZ77 [57]
and Huffman coded [38] to create a Huffman tree. For each block of compressed data,
the block may reference data which occurs in a previous block up to 32KB before
the current position. Each block has two parts, Huffman code trees that describe the
compressed data, and the actual compressed data. Each of the Huffman code trees
also is compressed using Huffman coding. The compressed data is represented by a
series of elements based on two types. The series is listed in the order that it appears
in the structure. The first type is a literal which is simply a string of bytes which
has not been duplicated in the previous 32KB of data. The next type is a pointer
which is a represented as a pair <length, distance> which describes the length of
the literal string and the distance (maximum 32KB) backwards in the structure to
that literal. The length of a literal is limited to 258 bytes and the length of an output
block is limited to 8KB under the C implementation [28].
Deflate/Inflate Processing
So how does ZLIB compress? ZLIB calls compression a deflate operation and de-
compression an inflate operation. As the compressor parses through the data, it
determines when to start new blocks of data, which is when the buffer becomes full
or when it determines that having new Huffman trees would be useful. For every
input block, the compressor looks at 3 byte sequences and writes it out to the output
block if it has not been seen. That sequence is written to a hash table for lookup
later on. If the sequence has been seen, then it will be in the hash table and the
compressor writes a pointer to the nearest previous 3 bytes and the total number
of bytes (length) that are the same. This compression process is shown in Figure
4-3. To improve compression, as the compressor finds sequences in the hash table,
it will make extra passes through the previous data in an attempt to find a longer
matching sequence. This is called lazy matching by the ZLIB authors. The algorithm
can be configured to spend less time trying to find longer matches to improve speed
of compression at the cost of a worse compression ratio [28].
Interface
Deflate Inflate
Basic Advanced Basic Advanced
deflateInit deflateInit2 inflateInit inflateInit2
deflate deflateCopy inflate inflateSync
deflateEnd deflateReset inflateEnd inflateReset
deflateSetDictionary inflateSetDictionary
Table 4.2: Core ZLIB API pertinent functions
The interface in Table 4.4.1 defines a z-stream structure which stores the com-
pressor/decompresser data needed for compression. A simple example of using the
ZLIB interface would be to initiate the stream with deflatelnit. Then the data
would be fed into the z-stream structure and processed with deflate. The stream
is closed with deflateEnd. In order to inflate the data, a user would use inflaternit,
then inflate and inflateEnd. The API offers options for the compression level from
Z-NO-COMPRESSION to ZBEST-COMPRESSION and also when to flush the data. Using
the functions deflateSetDictionary and inflateSetDictionary a pre-placed dictionary
of literals may also be input to prime the compressor [24]. Table 4.4.1 shows the
low-level functions available to the API users.
Our Takeaways
We concluded that ZLIB offers a simple way of compressing data while maintaining
recoverability and also offers tunable compression on different data sets using the
dictionary option. We next look at how ZLIB could be applied in the context of a
disadvantaged network. The following sections describe our studies into the best way
of using ZLIB to compress CMS data.
4.4.2 Optimal Conditions: Reliable TCP with Repeated CMS
Structures
The first exploration into using ZLIB we use an optimal situation, assuming a user
was sending the same CMS structure over the network with no network slowdowns
or outages. The performance of this test is shown in 6.3.3. The only difference in
the messages was the actual data sent in the package, which was set to random bytes
of data each time. We use ZLIB with its best compression and partial flushing of
the data for each CMS structure. When partial flushing is used, ZLIB maintains the
32KB of previous data from which to compress the data. When CMS structures are
repeated with the same senders and recipients, most of the CMS overhead will be
repeats of the same information. Therefore, ZLIB can compress this data out. Only
the random encapsulated data would be uncompressable. This test served as a lower
limit baseline for our use of ZLIB as real-world usage of CMS may not replicate this
scenario.
4.4.3 Worst Case Conditions: Disadvantaged Networks
The second case we investigated was the worst case condition. Results for this test
are discussed in section 6.3.3. In this case, we assume that there is no reliable uninter-
rupted stream of data coming from the network. Assuming CMS structures smaller
than one TCP or UDP packet, the ZLIB compression structures may need to be reset
many times because the connection between entities is unreliable. To simulate this
condition, we compressed every message separately. This assumes the compressor can
not utilize the previous data in the stream and represents the worst case when every
message must reset the ZLIB stream.
4.4.4 Priming the Pump:
Generating a CMS ZLIB Dictionary
The first two studies with optimal conditions and worst case conditions set the upper
and lower bounds for what kind of compression we could expect to generate from
compressing CMS messages. However, we would like to achieve near the compression
level similar to the one on the optimal network while being on an unreliable network.
Strategy
Our first solution to the problem was to preplace a static dictionary of commonly
used literals in CMS in the ZLIB stream in order to simulate ZLIB compressing a
number of CMS messages before sending each message. This way, the ZLIB stream
can be 'primed' with the CMS literals before compressing the new message to be
sent. This method improves compression toward what we get when there is optimal
conditions while assuming that compression can not rely on previous messages sent
on the network.
This strategy relies on how ZLIB creates compressed data. As mentioned in 4.4.1
ZLIB has a memory buffer which stores the last 32KB of data compressed by the
structure. In optimal conditions, the last 32KB contain previously sent CMS struc-
tures which can be referenced for compression gains. When we preplace a dictionary
in ZLIB, the dicitonary's strings fill some of the memory buffer and provide a ref-
erence that ZLIB can use to better compress the new message. However, since the
memory buffer is only 32KB, the dictionary can only be up to 32KB in size. Any
larger and it will not be able to be referenced when compressing the new message.
The side effect of the limit on dictionary size is that we must choose the literals to
put into the dictionary carefully.
Figure 4-3: ZLIB is preplaced with a dictionary full of literal strings which contain common
CMS data. The compressor can then reference those strings when creating the output and
use pointers rather than copying the original data.
Assembling a Dictionary
We attempted to find an optimal dictionary for compressing CMS structures, focusing
on the larger structures (Enveloped/Signed). The first approach we took was to
simply create every type of CMS message supported by OpenSSL and DER encode
them. Then we concatenated all those messages together as the dictionary. Next we
looked at how we could reduce the size of this dictionary by writing only the relative
constant data in all the CMS structures to the dictionary. Our assumption was that
any random-appearing or user-specific data in the CMS structure would not compress
out of the structure on average as these strings would not appear in another CMS
message.
The other method by which we attempt to reduce CMS overhead is by including
certificate information. As part of SignedData and EnvelopedData messages, as
mentioned in section 3.3 there are options to include both certificates and certificate
revocation lists. These pieces of data are sent so that recipients know which certificate
is being used to sign or encrypt the data. We created a dictionary made from a series
of commonly used root-level certificates using the pre-installed root certificates from
the Mozilla Firefox web browser [7] and DoD root certificates which may commonly
be used on DoD networks. In CMS, most messages will include user certificates as
root-level certificates are many times installed into hardware through other means.
However, user certificates are signed by higher-level certificates to establish trust, and
thus, most will have issuer names which may be included in root-level certificates.
This common data would compress when a dictionary with root level certificates is
used. Also, optional data included in CMS packages sometimes includes certificates
and certificate identifiers in CRLs. By including commonly used certificates in the
dictionary, these certificates will cost negligible space in transmission.
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CMS Convnon X
dictionary
Figure 4-4: Composition of one CMS dictionary. We also assembled dictionaries with full
CMS structures and dictionaries with certificate identifiers for commonly-used certificates
added to the dictionary.
Finally we found that identifiers for certificates are commonly sent in CMS mes-
sages so that recipients know which certificate is being used to sign or encrypt a
message. We added this identifier information for all the certificates we were testing
CMS with in order to compress this information.
We then concatenated the CMS dictionaries with the certificate dictionaries to test
their effectiveness compared to the worst case and ideal compression. The results are
shown in section 6.3. We show the different dictionaries tested in Table 4.3.
Compressing and Decompressing
The compression and decompression procedures are shown in Figures 4-5 and 4-6.
The CMS structure created is encapsulated by a ZLIB structure which contains
references to data in the CMS dictionary. Thus, during decompression, the same
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Dictionary Id Description
CMSStringDict CMS Shortened Strings
CMSFullDict CMS Full Structures
CMSFullCertDict CMS Full Structures + Root Certs
CMSStringCertDict CMS Strings + Root Certs
CMSFullIssuer CMS Full Structures + Dummy User Certificate Issuer and Serials
CMSStringlssuer CMS Strings + Dummy User Certificate Issuer and Serials
Table 4.3: Tested dictionary compositions
CMS Dictionary
CMS Structure ZLIB package
CMS Structure
CMS overhead
Message Data CMS overhead
CMS ZLIB compression
Message Data message Data
Figure 4-5: Compressing a CMS structure with a ZLIB dictionary
dictionary is needed on the receiver side. This creates a small problem with de-
compression. The recipient must have the preplaced CMS dictionary in order to
decompress the data, but if the dictionary is used, currently in CMS there is no way
of determining which version of the dictionary to use.
This problem with the dictionary can be solved by wrapping the ZLIB structure
in a CMS CompressedData structure and supplying it with a hash of the dictionary
data to use. The CMS parser with the recipient can then have a set of dictionaries
and compute the hash of each dictionary against the hash in the message in order
to determine which dictionary to use. The ASE authenticated data transmission
system may be used to exchange dictionaries in order optimize this procedure for
disadvantaged networks 1.
Alternatively, for a solution using less overhead, the CompressedData structure
could add an integer or name which acts as a universal resource identifier (URI) that
'Benjamin W. Fuller, Roger I. Khazan, Joseph A. Cooley, Galen E. Pickard, and Dan Utin. ASE:
Authenticated Statement Exchange, Submitted for publication, 2009.
Figure 4-6: Decompressing a CMS structure with ZLIB
uniquely identifies the dictionary to use in decompressing the message. Both of these
data elements could be optional parts of the CompressedData structure to be included
if a dictionary is used in compression.
We chose to use the MD5 hash solution and augmented the CMS CompressedData
structure with a string which stores the path to the dictionary file, an octet string
which stores the hash of the dictionary, and an algorithm identifier for the digest used
in the hash.
4.5 Content-Aware Compression to Reduce Over-
head: CMS Lite
We previously described how ZLIB compression reduces the overhead of CMS. This
method utilized a preplaced dictionary with CMS messages. We also explored another
way to reduce CMS-related overhead. We hoped that a custom translation of the
CMS structures to optimized structures could take advantage of our knowledge of the
structures of CMS. We reasoned that we should be able to create our own CMS-specific
compressed data type using lookups to replace data to compress messages. Thus, we
created CMS Lite. This version of CMS is a shortened and compressed version of
CMS which can be used to transfer CMS data over a disadvantaged network. CMS
Lite can then be inflated back into a normal CMS structure when the data is unpacked
by a recipient.
4.5.1 CMS Lite Design
The Lite version of CMS requires more intimate knowledge of the inner structures
in CMS than the ZLIB-powered generic data compression. In order to create a CMS
Lite structure, Lite versions of each subtype of CMS structure has to be created. In
these Lite versions, content type descriptors and algorithm descriptors are referenced
by a table lookup from a single integer value.
To limit the scope of what CMS Lite could compress, we put further limitations
on how the structures could be created for the Lite type. The number of algorithms
supported by this structure becomes more structured compared to the normal CMS
type. If there is an algorithm used that is not included in the lookup, then the Lite
structure can not be created and the original is preserved.
Next, we flattened structures in CMS, bringing the important data out of nested
structures so that more overhead would not be used to describe the inner structures.
Lite structures also can require specific configurations and key management structures
rather than have multiple nested ASN.1 structures to support any configuration so
that more data can be saved.
Finally, we found that identifiers for certificates could be hashed instead of sent
whole. The hash of the identifier can then be compared to hashes of certificate
identifier information rather than the full identifiers in order to recreate the original
messages. Similarly, a prefix of the identifier could be used in order to reference that
certificate.
4.5.2 Encode and Decode
CMS Lite is designed as a transfer data type only, which is similar to compressed data
types. Thus, no CMS API functions can be called using the CMS Lite data structures
even though Lite structures may resemble their normal CMS counterparts. Figure 4-7
shows a possible use of CMS Lite. The structure is meant to be the transfer structure
for the CMS data, which is then reverted to the original CMS structure.
Convert to
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Figure 4-7: CMS Lite encode/decode
4.5.3 CMS Lite Transformations
For CMS Lite we define a LiteData content type at the same level as all the other
CMS content types. It contains a choice of parameterized lite versions of each of the
other CMS content types. Its ASN.1 structure is shown below in Listing 4.1.
// CMS LiteData includes a choice of parameters representing
// All of the different CMS contentTypes
CMS LiteData ::= CHOICE {
signedParams CMSSigned-params,
envelopedParams CMSEnveloped.params,
digestedParams CMSDigested-params,
encryptedParams CMSEncrypted.params,
authenticatedParams CMS-Authenticatedparams,
compressedParams CMSCompressed.params
}
Listing 4.1: CMS Lite
The transformations and changes for each CMS contentType are detailed below:
CMS EnvelopedData Transform
In order to reduce overhead in EnvelopedData structures, the encryptedContentInf o
is flattened by taking out the encrypted data and contentEncryptionAlgorithm and
the contentType and key management encryption algorithm (used to encrypt the
content encryption key) are defined by the parameter. The encryptAlg information
stores the initialization vector and algorithm information for the content encryption
key which is used to encrypt the data. OriginatorInf o (certificates and CRLs) can
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be sent with the data as an option, but will not be compressed in the CMS Lite
structure. The updated structures are shown in Listings 4.2 and 4.3.
The key management schemes all have parameter versions as well. In general
the parameterized versions insert a lookup for any static algorithm identifiers and
also instead of using the full certificate issuer name and serial number or subject key
identifier to identify any certificates, uses a hash of that data instead.
One limitation is that since the parameter can only give one key management
key encryption algorithm, only one type of key encryption algorithm can be used
for all recipients, making the Lite type a little more restrictive than the normal
CMS EnvelopedData type. As seen in Listing 4.3 the recipientInf os do not have
encryption algorithms defined. They instead all use the parameter in the Enveloped
Params structure to define the algorithm instead. The algorithms used are necessarily
limited to ones defined in the lookup.
EnvelopedData ::= SEQUENCE {
version CMSVersion,
originatorInfo [0] IMPLICIT OriginatorInfo OPT,
recipientInfos SET SIZE (1...MAX) OF RecipientInfos,
encryptedContentInfo EncryptedContentInfo,
unprotectedAttrs [1] IMPLICIT UnprotectedAttributes OPT
}
RecipientInfo ::= CHOICE {
ktri KeyTransRecipientInfo ,
kari KeyAgreeRecipientInfo,
}
KeyTransRecipientInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
version CMSVersion,
rid CMSSignerIdentifier // issuer/serial or subjectkey
keyEncryptionAlgorithm X509-ALGORITHM
encryptedKey OCTET STRING
}
Listing 4.2: Normal EnvelopedData
Enveloped-params ::= SEQUENCE {
version CMSVersion,
recipientInfos SET SIZE (1...MAX) OF Recipient-params,
parameter LONG,
encryptAlg X509_ALGORITHM,
eContent OCTET STRING
}
Recipient-params ::= CHOICE {
ktp KeyTransParams,
kap KeyAgreeParams,
kekp KEKParams,
pwdp PasswordParams
}
KeyTransParams ::= SEQUENCE {
version CMSVersion,
sidHash LONG, //issuer/serial or subjectkey ID hash
type LONG, // tells whether sidHash is issuer/serial or
subjectkey
encryptedKey OCTET STRING
}
Listing 4.3: Reduced EnvelopedData
CMS SignedData Transform
In the SignedData structure, we eliminate the OPTIONAL certificates and CRLs
to be sent with the data. The encapsulatedContentInf o is flattened with the
contentType of the encapsulated data then identified by the parameter. The con-
tent is placed in eContent. The set of digest algorithms in the normal type can be
eliminated as it is normally included for one-pass processing efficiencies, which we
gladly give up for less space usage. These updates and the original structures are
shown in Listings 4.4 and 4.5.
In the set of SignerInfo we replace digest algorithm and signature algorithm
identifiers with a lookup table parameter. Then we hash the signerIdentif ier once
more to reduce its overhead.
There are a few limitations introduced by the CMS Lite transformation. The al-
gorithms used for signature and digest must be in the lookup table. Also certificates
and CRLs should be sent via another mechanism. Signed attributes can be included
in the SignerInf o Params structure but we choose not to implement including un-
signed attributes since OpenSSL generally does not add any unsigned attributes in
its implementation.
SignedData ::= SEQUENCE {
version CMSVersion,
digestAlgorithms SET OF DigestAlgorithmIdentifiers,
encapContentInfo EncapsulatedContentInfo
certificates SET OF CertificateSet OPTIONAL,
crls SET OF RevokationInfoChoice OPTIONAL,
signerInfos SET OF (1.. .MAX) SignerInfo,
}
SignerInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
version CMSVersion,
sid SignerIdentifier // issuer + serial or subject key ID
digestAlgorithm DigestAlgorithmIdentifier
signedAttrs SET OF (0.. .MAX) SignedAttributes OPTIONAL,
signatureAlgorithm SignatureAlgorithmIdentifier,
signature OCTET STRING,
unsignedAttrs SET OF (0... MAX) UnsignedAttributes
OPTIONAL,
}
Listing 4.4: Normal SignedData
CMS DigestedData and CMS EncryptedData Transforms
In the DigestedData structure shown in Listings 4.6 4.7 we are able to create a
lookup for the content type and for the digest algorithm to save a 10-20 bytes. In
the EncryptedData structure shown in Listings 4.8 and 4.9 we can only flatten the
encryptedContentInfo structure and add a lookup for the content type.
Signed params ::= SEQUENCE {
version CMSVersion,
contentType LONG,
eContent OCTET STRING,
signerInfos SET OF (1.. .MAX) SignerInfo params,
}
SignerInfo params ::= SEQUENCE {
version CMSVersion,
type LONG, // tells us what type sidHash is
sidHash LONG, // signerIdentifier hash
parameter LONG, // LOOKUP for signature and digest
algorithms
signedAttrs SignedAttributes OPTIONAL,
signature OCTET STRING
}
Listing 4.5: Reduced SignedData
DigestedData ::= SEQUENCE {
version CMSVersion,
digestAlgorithm X509_ALGORITHM,
encapContentInfo EncapsulatedContentInfo, //holds data
digest OCTET STRING,
}
Listing 4.6: Normal DigestedData
Digested params ::= SEQUENCE {
version CMSVersion,
contentType LONG,
eContent OCTET STRING,
digest OCTET STRING,
}
Listing 4.7: Reduced DigestedData
Listing 4.8: Normal EncryptedData
Encrypted params ::= SEQUENCE {
version CMSVersion,
contentType LONG,
encryptAlg X509_ALGORITHM,
eContent OCTET STRING,
}
Listing 4.9: Reduced EncryptedData
CMS CompressedData Transform
We had already modified the original CompressedData according to section 4.4.4 by
adding an identifier for a dictionary. Our method of adding an identifier was to add
a digest to the CompressedData. Our other transforms to this structure were to
add lookups for algorithms and the content type. These transforms are shown in
Listing 4.11.
CompressedData ::= SEQUENCE {
version CMSVersion,
compressionAlgorithm X509_ALGORITHM,
encapContentInfo EncapsulatedContentInfo,
dictionaryAlgorithm X509_ALGORITHM,
dictionaryDigest OCTET STRING,
}
Listing 4.10: Normal CompressedData
EncryptedData ::= SEQUENCE {
version CMSVersion,
\\ Data + Encryption Algorithm
encryptedContentInfo EncryptedContentInfo,
unprotectedAttrs SET OF unprotectedAttrs OPTIONAL,
}
Compressed params ::= SEQUENCE {
version CMSVersion,
parameter LONG, // lookup for compressionAlg + digestAlg
eContent OCTET STRING,
dictionaryDigest OCTET STRING,
}
Listing 4.11: Reduced CompressedData
CMS AuthenticatedData Transform
AuthenticatedData contains a message authentication code algorithm and optional
digest algorithm. The Lite version of AuthenticatedData implements parameters
for these algorithms and repeats the same modifications done to the EnvelopedData
for its RecipientInf o data. The results are shown in Listing 4.13.
AuthenticatedData ::= SEQUENCE {
version CMSVersion,
originatorInfo originatorInfo OPTIONAL,
recipientInfos RecipientInfos,
macAlgorithm MessageAuthenticationCodeAlgorithm,
digestAlgorithm DigestAlgorithmIdentifier OPTIONAL,
encapContentInfo EncapsulatedContentInfo,
authAttrs AuthAttributes OPTIONAL,
mac MessageAuthenticationCode,
unauthAttrs UnauthAttributes OPTIONAL
}
Listing 4.12: Normal AuthenticatedData
Authenticated params ::= SEQUENCE {
version CMSVersion,
originatorInfo originatorInfo- OPTIONAL,
recipientInfos RecipientInfo params,
parameter LONG, // for algorithms and contenttype
eContent OCTET STRING
authAttrs AuthAttributes OPTIONAL,
mac MessageAuthenticationCode,
unauthAttrs UnauthAttributes OPTIONAL
}
Listing 4.13: Reduced AuthenticatedData
4.5.4 Using CMS Lite
The CMS Lite structure performs tradeoffs to achieve smaller message size. Some
of the data elements in CMS are used to increase efficiency in parsing the message.
These are cut out in CMS Lite. Other data elements increase the flexibility of the
structure. We use parameters to perform lookups into tables instead of allowing
any type of algorithms and contentType. This saves space but limits the number of
algorithms that can be expressed to those which are already known and accounted
for. Finally, eliminating some OPTIONAL certificate, CRL, and attribute data limits
the range of data that can be passed through CMS. All these changes help reduce the
size of the message in a disadvantaged network situation.
We note CMS's encapsulation properties in section 3.3.1. CMS Lite can also be
used in these circumstances, but should be used in a specific order. When creating
encapsulated structures, each level of structure should be encoded into a CMS Lite
structure before moving to the next level. This is because none of the data inside
each structure is known. On receipt, the recipient would then have to run CMS Lite
decoding on each level of the structure to recreate the original message. The reverse
procedure would have to be done for the recipient to unfold and decode the structure.
A nested CMS structure encoding procedure is shown in Figure 4-8.
CompressedData
encode
Lite Compressed
params
encode
I encode
Normal nested structure
Figure 4-8: Encoding encapsulated CMS Lite structures
4.5.5 Table Lookups
One of the ways we reduce overhead is by using lookups for certain types of informa-
tion in CMS. We reduce several table lookups into one parameter which is stored as
a LONG type. The information in the long is stored bitwise. Each type of information
has a bitmask with 4 bits of information unmasked for each content type in the table.
On encode, CMS Lite processes all the constant data to be put in the parameter and
creates integer identifiers for each piece of data according to the lookup table. The
identifiers are bit shifted according to their type and added to the parameter. The
lookup table with the bit masks and shifts is shown in Table 4.4.
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4.6 CMS Lite and ZLIB
A limitation of the CMS Lite transform is that optional data like attributes, certifi-
cates, and CRLs can not be easily reduced in size. These optional structures may
have a large number of configurations, and thus specifying a transform for each one
would be both time consuming and only beneficial in certain circumstances.
However, a possible solution to this problem is to create a CMS Lite transform,
then compress it using ZLIB with preplaced dictionaries as described in section 4.4.4.
The dictionary could be modified to add in common optional data in certificates,
CRLs, and attributes. CMS Lite would eliminate overhead due to ASN.1 encoding
and fixed structures while ZLIB would eliminate overhead from the optional data. In
order to regain the original CMS structure, the ZLIB-compressed CMS Lite structure
would have to be decompressed by ZLIB, then decoded from CMS Lite to normal
CMS structures. This potential solution has not been tested, but is an idea for
further research in this field.
4.7 Summary
We performed a study on Cryptographic Message Syntax in an attempt to optimize
the use of CMS in a disadvantaged network. We presented a few possible solutions to
optimize CMS by reducing its message overhead. The first method to reduce overhead
was through compression of the constant literals in CMS. In this method we used
ZLIB while priming the compressor with a preplaced static dictionary containing
CMS messages. The second method was to create a Lite version of CMS which
reduced the size of each CMS message. These solutions are evaluated in Chapter 6
according to their recoverability, flexibility, extensibility, and simplicity. For both
ZLIB compression and CMS Lite there is an issue of applying them to a CMS message
that contains encrypted CMS messages. However, we can get around this limitation
if we apply the compression methods first before encryption.
Name Parameter mask] Value ] Data Type
AES-128bit-cbc OxOOOOOF 1 Data Encryption Alg
AES-256bit-cbc OxOOOOF 2 Data Encryption Alg
RC4 OxOOOOOF 3 Data Encryption Alg
RC4-32-12-16-cbc OxOOOOOF 4 Data Encryption Alg
CAMELLIA256cbc OxOOOOF 5 Data Encryption Alg
bfcbc OxOOOOOF 6 Data Encryption Alg
ideacbc OxOOOOOF 7 Data Encryption Alg
cast5cbc OxOOOOOF 8 Data Encryption Alg
des-ede3-cbc OxOOOOOF 9 Data Encryption Alg
des-ede-cbc OxOOOOOF 0 Data Encryption Alg
data OxOOOFO 0 Content Type
signed OxOOOOFO 1 Content Type
enveloped OxOOOFO 2 Content Type
signedandenveloped OxOOOOFO 0 Content Type
digested OxOOOOF0 4 Content Type
encrypted Ox0000F0 5 Content Type
compressed 0x0000F0 6 Content Type
lite OxOOO0FO 7 Content Type
RSA Encryption 0x000F00 0 Key Management Alg
RSA Encryption Ox0OFOOO 0 Signature Alg
DSA-with-SHA1 0x00F000 1 Signature Alg
ECDSA-with-SHA1 0x00F000 2 Signature Alg
md2 0x0F0000 0 Digest Alg
md4 Ox0F0000 1 Digest Alg
md5 0x0F0000 2 Digest Alg
shal Ox0F0000 3 Digest Alg
dss 0x0F0000 4 Digest Alg
ecdsa 0x0F0000 5 Digest Alg
sha224 0x0F0000 6 Digest Alg
sha256 0x0F0000 7 Digest Alg
sha384 OxOFOOO 8 Digest Alg
sha512 0x0F0000 9 Digest Alg
mdc2 0x0FO000 10 Digest Alg
ripemd160 0x0F0000 11 Digest Alg
Table 4.4: CMS Lite parameter lookup table
CMS Structure Parameterized Variables [Data Type
encryptedContentType Content Type
EnvelopedData contentEncryptionAlgorithm Data Encryption Alg
keyEncryptionAlgorithm Key Management Encryption Alg
encapContentType Content Type
SignedData digestAlgorithm signerInfo Digest Alg
signatureAlgorithm signerInfo Signature Alg
EncryptedData encryptedContentType ContentType
encapContentType Content Type
DigestedData digestAlgorithm Digest Alg
CompressedData encapContentType Content Type
Compressedata dictionaryAlgorithm Digest Alg
Table 4.5: Variables in each CMS Structure which are replaced by parameters
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Chapter 5
Implementation of Techniques
In the previous chapter we examined a few methods to eliminate overhead in CMS
messages. We described ZLIB in detail and how to improve per-message compression
using a static, preplaced dictionary composed of common message elements. We also
described methods used to create a Lite version of CMS which used lookups, hashes,
and reduced optional data in order to decrease the size of the CMS message. These
methods can encode a message for transport on a network and decode it in order to
restore the original messages.
This chapter is geared toward an implementor possibly working on or extending
this work. Here we discuss the details of our implementation environment. Then we
discuss how we extended OpenSSL to use dictionaries. Finally, we describe how to
manipulate ASN.1 structures in the OpenSSL library to create the new CMS Lite
structure and how we encode and decode from normal CMS messages to CMS Lite
messages.
5.1 Technologies Used
Before we delve into problem details, we describe the development environment, tools,
and libraries used to implement and test our software. We mention tools and libraries
that we used to build our solutions as well as systems that we depended upon and
used to test our implementation.
5.1.1 Tools and Environment
The development environment consisted of Ubuntu 8.04 Hardy Heron running as a
VMware Workstation [15] image on a Windows XP laptop. The majority of code was
written with the vim [14] text editor, and ctags [2] allowed vim to quickly navigate
among symbols and files. In order to incorporate code into larger projects we used
GNU Autotools [12]. The tool gdb [3] proved invaluable in debugging. Finally, this
document was created using ITEX with the editor Kile [5].
5.1.2 Libraries and APIs
Several libraries were important to the successful completion of this study. The
CMS optimizations rely heavily on previously developed code, as it would have been
impossible to complete without it, and because there's no sense in reinventing the
wheel.
ZLIB
We chose ZLIB not only because it offered lossless compression, but also because the
API for ZLIB was readily available. The ZLIB API has an associated Perl API and
also can be added as an option to OpenSSL. Our code used the C API of ZLIB version
1.2.3 described in Table 4.4.1.
OpenSSL
Our implementation is highly dependent on OpenSSL [13]. OpenSSL is an open-
source effort that implements a general-purpose cryptographic library, various crypto-
graphic message packing formats, SSLv2/v3, and TLSv1. In version 0.9.8h, OpenSSL
included support for handling CMS. We modified that support in version 0.9.8j to
implement our ZLIB compression scheme and CMS Lite. The CMS library is disabled
by default and must be enabled while configuring OpenSSL.
We enable OpenSSL's use of ZLIB compression. We also build OpenSSL as a
shared library for use by our testing infrastructure. We used the OpenSSL ver-
sion 0.9.8j as the base version for our tests. During the build process, we configure
OpenSSL for our needs by using the following command line:
./configure enable-cms zlib shared
The first option builds CMS support, including our modifications. The second links
in ZLIB support, which OpenSSL can use internally, and which we rely on for our
ZLIB performance enhancements. The final option causes the build system to create
a shared library for use by our testing infrastructure.
As of version 1.0.0-beta2, the OpenSSL library supports only a subset of CMS.
For instance, the OpenSSL CMS library only supports one form of key management,
Key Transport mode. Within Key Transport, only RSA certificates can be used.
This limits our interoperability with GROK 1 and ASE, sister projects for developing
efficient cryptographic systems on disadvantaged networks, since they require different
key management modes and elliptic curve certificates.
Here are some helpful hints for users modifying the OpenSSL source: OpenSSL
offers several facilities to help find and reduce bugs in code that relies on the library.
They include error messages, a safe stack implementation, and a set of regressions
tests, which can be found in the UTIL/ directory of the source code. Errors can be
generated with mkerr. pl by specifying a function code for the name of the function
in which the error occurs and a reason code explaining why the error occurred. For
instance, if the user wanted to generate an error in the function CMSEncrypt.Data,
then the associated function code might be CMS_FENCRYPTDATA and reason code might
be CMS_R_NOCERTIFICATE. The mkstack.p1 script will create type-specific functions for
stack access for every ASN.1 type for which DECLARESTACKOF (TYPE) has been called.
5.2 Compression Implementation
This next section details some of the structures and functions used to create a com-
pressed CMS type with a preplaced dictionary. We will also look at some of the
'Joseph Cooley, Roger Khazan, Benjamin Fuller, and Galen Pickard. GROK: A Practical System
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functions we used to create CMS dictionaries to support zlib compression. For each
part we will look at the high-level functionality of the code, then give some code
snippets which should help an implementer understand the low-level details.
5.2.1 Strategy
We used the OpenSSL BIO facility to implement CMS ZLIB compression. These
structures are used to perform input and output over a variety of interfaces. BIO
structures can read and write from network interfaces, files on disk, and in-memory
structures. Other BIO structures act as filters for data. Message digest computation,
encryption algorithm input/output, and compression are also implemented using BIO
structures. In order to create the compressed data from the input data, we use the
following function calls.
BIO *memory;
BIO *zlib;
BIO *data;
BIO *chain;
memory = cmscontent-bio() // create a new memory storage BIO
zlib = BIO-f-zlib() // Initialize the ZLIB BIO filter
BIOsetDict(zlib,dictionary) // set the dictionary file
chain = BIOpush(zlib, memory) // Add the memory BIO to the end
// of the ZLIB BIO
// Write the input data BIO through the
// zlib filter to the memory bio
SMIMEcrlfcopy(data,chain);
CMSdataFinal(cms,chain);
// Store the resulting data into the cms structure
cms-copy-content(chain,out); // Decompress
Listing 5.1: Creating compressed data
A similar procedure to the one in listing 5.1 is used to compress and decompress the
data in the compressed data type. We add the BIO-setDict function in this listing.
This function takes a character string representing the path to the dictionary file
and loads the dictionary file into memory with a maximum size of 32KB (since ZLIB
doesn't support more than a 32KB dictionary). The BIO chains are constructed as
shown in Figure 5-1 Two other pieces of data are used to reference the dictionary in
the CMS CompressedData structure. We took the approach using a dictionary digest
to reference the dictionary. To create the digest, we re-used OpenSSL code to create
a digest, and copied the content and the digest algorithm into the CompressedData
structure. To uncompress a structure, a user must select a dictionary that matches
the dictionary used to compress the message. The user's dictionary digest is matched
to the digest sent with the payload before uncompressing the structure with the input
dictionary. The function returns NULL and error messages if the dictionaries do not
match or if the data can not be uncompressed.
CMS Compressed Structure
Filtered Input
data
F itered Input
Figure 5-1: The ZLIB filter compresses data and writes it into the adjacent BIO.
The adjacent BIO, a memory BIO, stores the data into the data section of the
CompressedData CMS structure.
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5.2.2 Extending ZLIB BIO
In order to support a dictionary, the ZLIB BIO structure needed to have pointers to
the data and the length of the data. BIO-setDict calls a macro BIOsetDict(b, f)=>
BIO_ctrl(b, BIOCTRLCOMPZLIBDICT, 0, f) This calls functions available only to the
zlib BIOs and will return errors if called on other BIO types. In ZLIB, this will call,
BIO-setDictionary(BIO *b, char *filename), which is listed below in Listing 5.2.
int BIOsetDictionary(BIO *b, char *filename)
{
BIOZLIBCTX *ctx;
FILE *f;
if(!b) return 0;
ctx = (BIOZLIBCTX *)b->ptr;
// throw away previous dictionary
if(ctx->dbuf != NULL){
OPENSSLfree(ctx->dbuf);
ctx->dbuf = NULL;
ctx->dbufsize = 0;
}
f fopen(filename, \"rb\");
// Error if the file can not be opened
if (!f)
{
COMPerr(COMP_F_BIOZLIBSETDICT,
COMP_R_ZLIBFILEOPENFAILURE);
return 0;
}
fseek(f, 0, SEEKEND);
ctx->dbufsize = ftell(f);
fseek(f, 0, SEEK.SET);
// Allocate the dictionary
ctx->dbuf = (unsigned char *)
OPENSSLmalloc(ctx->dbufsize+1);
// Read in to the buffer from the file
fread(ctx->dbuf, ctx->dbufsize, 1, f);
fclose(f);
return 1;
}
Listing 5.2: BIG setDictionary: allocates memory for a dictionary in the ZLIB BIO
and stores the dictionary size
When reading and writing through this BIO, a couple of modifications were made
to incorporate the dictionary using the ZLIB API. When reading in a BIO, inflate
returns a code if it needs a dictionary to inflate the data.
ret = inflate(zin, 0);
If the dictionary is needed, the dictionary buffer is checked and the ZLIB function
inflateSetDictionary called if the dictionary is found, as shown in Listing 5.3.
while (data available to inflate)
{
if(ret == Z_NEEDDICT)
{
// If no dictionary set
if (!ctx->dbuf)
{
COMPerr(COMP_F_BIO_ZLIB.READ,
COMP_R_ZLIBNODICTERROR);
return 0;
}
// Give ZLIB the dictionary from the
// BIO buffer dbuf
ret = inflateSetDictionary
(zin,ctx->dbuf,ctx->dbufsize);
continue;
}
}
Listing 5.3: ZLIB inflateSetDictionary
If writing out a ZLIB BIO with a dictionary, deflateSetDictionary(zout, ctx->dbuf,
ctx->dbufsize) is called before writing any data to set up the preplaced dictionary.
The major modifications for these changes are in the OpenSSL source directory in
CRYPTO/COMP/CZLIB.C.
5.2.3 Extending the CMS CompressedData Type
Few changes are required to support dictionaries in the CompressedData structure.
Two new library functions are defined in cms.h:
CMSContentInfo *CMS-compress-dict(BIO *in, char *dictionary,
const EVPMD *md, unsigned int flags)
int CMS-uncompress-dict(CMSContentInfo *cms, char *dictionary,
BIO *dcont, BIO *out, unsigned int flags)
CMS-compressdict takes the input, dictionary path, message digest structure, and
output flags and creates a new CMS_ContentInfo. The function CMS-uncompressdict
uses the CompressedData structure, a path to a dictionary, an output BIO, and flags
to reverse the process. It returns a code indicating success and stores uncompressed
data in the output BIO. These two functions are listed below in Listing 5.4 and
Listing 5.5.
CMSContentInfo *cms = NULL;
CMSContentInfo *digestedDict = NULL;
CMSCompressedData *cd = NULL;
BIO *dict;
dict = BIOnew-file (dictionary, "r");
digestedDict = CMS-digest-create(dict, md, flags);
cms = cms-CompressedData-create(NID-zlib-compression);
cd = cms->d.compressedData;
cd->dictionaryAlgorithm = X509_ALGOR-newo;
if (!md)
md = EVP-shal();
cmsDigestAlgorithm-set(cd->dictionaryAlgorithm,md);
cd->dictionaryDigest = ASN1_OCTETSTRING-newo;
ASN1_OCTETSTRING-set(cd->dictionaryDigest,
digestedDict ->d. digestedData->digest ->data,
digestedDict->d.digestedData->digest->length);
cd->dict = (char *)OPENSSL-malloc(strlen(dictionary));
strcpy(cd->dict,dictionary);
CMSContentInfo-free(digestedDict);
BIO_free(dict);
if (CMS-final(cms, in, NULL, flags))
return cms;
Listing 5.4: CMS compress dict
BIO *cont;
BIO *new;
BIO *dict;
BIO *digest;
BIO *pushed;
int r;
CMSCompressedData *cd;
dict = BIO.new-file(dictionary, "r");
cd = cms->d.compressedData;
new = BIO-new(BIO-s-mem();
digest = cmsDigestAlgorithm-init-bio
(cd->dictionaryAlgorithm);
pushed = BIO-push(digest,new);
SMIME-crlf-copy(dict, pushed, flags);
(void)BIOflush(pushed);
r = cms-CompressedData-verify(cms, pushed);
if (r == 0)
{
CMSerr(CMSFCMSUNCOMPRESSDICT,
CMS_RCOMPRESSEDNOTVERIFIED);
BIOfree(new);
BIOfree(dict);
BIO-free(digest);
return 0;
}
if (cd->dict)
{
OPENSSLfree(cd->dict);
cd->dict = NULL;
cd->dict = (char *)OPENSSLmalloc
(strlen(dictionary));
strcpy(cd->dict,dictionary);
cont = CMSdataInit(cms, dcont);
if (!cont)
return 0;
r = cms-copy-content(out,
dofree-upto(cont, dcont)
BIO_free(new);
BIO-free(dict);
BIO-free(digest);
return r;
cont , flags)
Listing 5.5: CMS uncompress dict
CMS contentType Data Included in Dictionary Data Excluded
from Dictionary
All Content Types Version numbers, contentType identi- encapsulated content
fiers
EnvelopedData content encryption algorithm, key en- content encryption
cryption algorithm, certificate public keys
key identifiers, originator identifying
information, unprotected attributes
SignedData certificate public key identifiers, di- signatures, certifi-
gest algorithms, signature algorithms, cates, certificate
signed attributes revocation lists
EncryptedData content encryption algorithm, unpro- encrypted data
tected attributes
DigestedData digest algorithm digest
CompressedData compression algorithm, signer identi- dictionary digest, con-
fier, key encryption algorithms tent encryption keys,
key encryption keys
Table 5.1: Strings included in condensed CMS dictionary
5.2.4 Creating a Dictionary
Writing CMS Strings
To test ZLIB compression, as discussed in section 4.4.4, we need to generate a dic-
tionary of partial CMS structures. Normally, OpenSSL outputs a full DER encoded
structure using the function i2dCMSbio(BIO *out, CMSContentInfo *cms). We aug-
mented this functionality in the following function, using the OpenSSL ASN.1 API
and its CMS structures: int CMS-getStrings(BIO *out, CMSContentInfo *cms)
In the function, we determine which contentType the CMS structure refers to, then
write the fixed parts of the different CMS messages to the out BIO structure. Gener-
ally we define the fixed parts as version numbers, content types, algorithm definitions,
and other non user-specific data. We define the variable parts as user identifiers, sig-
natures, digests, keys, and content. All this fixed data is written in DER encoding to
the BIO structure. Table 5.2.4 shows which data is included for each content type.
We created a sample CMS message for each contentType using one sender and
one receiver for each contentType and wrote all these samples to condensed string
versions excluding variable data.
We also used full CMS structures in the dictionary instead of condensing them first
to non-user specific data. For both these versions, we then wrote all the structures
out to disk in a row via a file BIO. This concatenation of CMS structures or strings
is the CMS part of the dictionary.
Certificates
In order to generate a set of certificates which may be commonly referenced or trans-
mitted, we relied the methods that Internet browsers use to establish trust. Mozilla's
Firefox [7] browser as well as Microsoft's Internet Explorer [4] and any other major
browser all have root level certificates pre-installed in the browser to establish chains
of trust. If websites provide certificates which are signed by some chain of certificates
which eventually goes back to a root-level installed certificate, the browser assumes we
can trust that chain of certificates. Thus, information in these root level certificates
should be referenced quite frequently in many cryptographic messages.
We exported a subset of the pre-installed root level certificates as well as some
DoD root certificates from DISA all in DER encoding. These certificates were then
concatenated all together to form a certificate package.
Cutting Down on Certificate Size in the CMS Dictionary
We found that the CMS part of the dictionary was 250 bytes for CMS strings and 450
bytes for full CMS structures. However, the certificate package part of the dictionary
encompassed much much more of the space. Each certificate we included in the orig-
inal dictionary took around 1024 bytes. When the size of the dictionary is limited to
32KB of data, that means 32 certificates can be stored in the dictionary. Considering
the large number of certificates available even in the Internet browser, this is a serious
limitation. Thus, we considered as an optimization, parsing out just the issuer names
of the certificates since the issuer name is sent to identify which certificate was used
in signing or encrypting in SignedData and EnvelopedData structures. We could've
also included other fields common to many certificates, such as algorithm types. We
then made a certificate package of just these issuer names. Each issuer name only
accounted for 50 bytes of space compared to the 1024 bytes used before. This means
that we could fit about 640 certificates in the certificate part of the dictionary instead
of 32, a 20x improvement. A dictionary was then constructed with just issuer names.
Later, in section 6.3 we explore the performance associated with each dictionary type.
Putting it Together
Partial CMS strings and the certificate package were concatenated together to form a
full ZLIB dictionary for CMS. The dictionary is preplaced and used in BIO-setDictionary
to compress and uncompress CMS messages. The total sizes of the dictionaries were
kept under 32KB in order to stay under the limit imposed by ZLIB, as discussed in
section 4.4.
5.3 CMS Lite
We just described extensions to OpenSSL for creating a CMS CompressedData type,
and the methodology used to generate a CMS-specific dictionary. This section details
some of the structures and functions used to create a CMS Lite data type, which
uses content-aware compression to reduce CMS overhead. We also detail how an
implementor can extend this work and use the library code in OpenSSL to create
other types. For each part we will look at the high-level functionality of the code,
then give some code snippets which should help an implementor understand the low-
level details. We will first describe some requirements for the code, then discuss how
we created an ASN.1 type for CMS Lite in OpenSSL. We then describe the encoding
and decoding processes and summarize.
5.3.1 Requirements
CMS Lite is meant to trade off some of the flexibility afforded by ASN.1 notation
and CMS for a reduction in message size. In addition, the implementation meets the
requirements specified in section 4.3 (recoverable, flexible, extendable, and simple to
implement) by adhering to the following:
o Copy user-specific data: Data which is used once per message, such as a content
encryption key or initialization vector, must be copied straight from the CMS
message to the CMS Lite message. Signatures and encrypted data must also be
copied byte for byte.
o Use ASN.1 API: The current CMS implementation uses the OpenSSL ASN.1
API to perform input/output and allocation operations on data structures.
Reuse of these functions allows our code to rely on well-tested code.
o Encode and decode: Encoding and decoding between CMS Lite and CMS
content types requires different encoding and decoding functions for each type.
o Adding algorithms: Combinations of algorithms should be easy to add to the
implementation.
5.3.2 Adding ASN.1 Types for the CMS API
This section details how we used the ASN.1 syntax and API to create a CMS Lite
type. The overview will help elucidate our CMS Lite extension.
ASN.1 Notation
ASN.1 describes a method of representing data in two ways. First, it separates the
way the data is encoded from how it is sent. The ITU standard X.209 defines the
methods of encoding data, of which two are Distinguished Encoding Rules (DER) [22]
and XML Encoding Rules (XER) [20]. DER specifies data as a series of triplets of
data type, length, then value while XER specifies each data type as an XML tag with
the content inside the tag.
The second part of the ASN.1 standard involves the notation of data. In ITU
standard X.208 [21]the basic syntax for ASN.1 structures is defined. Some of the
common terms used in ASN.1 are SEQUENCE which means that a series of data is
next. The OCTET STRING type identifies an eight-bit byte string of data. Some other
common types are INTEGER which defines a byte representation of an integer, and a
BOOLEAN which defines a 0 or 1 value. CMS definitions contain several terms with
ASN.1 data qualifiers. The OPTIONAL qualifier means that the data element may not
be included while SET OF means that there is a grouping of multiple pieces of a data
type. The CHOICE qualifier means that one of the following pieces of data is chosen,
UNION means that a set of the options is chosen. These types are all used in the CMS
definitions set in RFC 3852 [35).
OpenSSL ASN.1 API
The OpenSSL ASN.1 API attempts to abstract away the details of how the different
data structures for each ASN.1 object are created and allow the developer to use a
syntax similar to the one used in defining ASN.1 objects. The Table 5.2 shows some
of the useful functions for defining new ASN.1 structures. All these functions are
accessible through the OpenSSL header files path/base.
Function Description
ASN1.SEQUENCE Define a named sequence of data types. This connects a
previously defined C structure to this ASN.1 type name.
Both must have matching data types in order to cor-
rectly store the data
ASN1_CHOICE Define a CHOICE data element
ASN1_SIMPLE Create a simple ASN1 Object
ASN1-IMP Creates an IMPLICIT object
ASN1_IMP-SETOF Creates a SET OF a data type
AN1_OPT OPTIONAL data added to a sequence
DECLAREASN1-ITEM Allows a previously defined sequence or item to be used.
Also defines allocation and encoding/decoding functions
for the item using the ASN.1 library
DECLARESTACKOF Defines allocation, push and pop, and free functions for
a safe stack implementation of an ASN.1 type
Table 5.2: OpenSSL ASN.1 library functions
CMS Lite Definitions
We liberally used the OpenSSL ASN.1 API in order to create the CMS Lite definitions
and modify the CMS implementation to include a CMS Lite structure. We called this
new data type LiteData and it is defined as a top-level contentType under CMS. Its
CMS implementation is shown in Listing 5.6. It is defined as a choice of parameters
representing the other contentTypes. This ASN.1 definition then matches with the
designed data type shown in Listing 4.1. Similar ASN.1 structures were created for
every other type of transforms shown in section 4.5.3. The full ASN.1 definitions for
these structures are in CRYPTO/CMS/CMSASN1.C in our modified OpenSSL imple-
mentation. They are also listed in Appendix A.
ASN1_CHOICE(CMSLiteData) = {
ASN1_IMP(CMSLiteData, params.signedParams,
CMSSignedparams, 0),
ASN1IMP(CMSLiteData, params.envelopedParams,
CMSEnveloped-params , 1),
ASN1_IMP(CMSLiteData, params.digestedParams
CMSDigested-params, 2),
ASN1_IMP (CMSLiteData, params .encryptedParams,
CMSEncryptedparams , 3),
ASN1_IMP(CMSLiteData, params.authenticatedParams,
CMSAuthenticated-params, 4),
ASN1_IMP(CMSLiteData, params.compressedParams
CMSCompressed-params , 5)
} ASN1_CHOICEEND(CMSLiteData)
Listing 5.6: CMS LiteData
5.3.3 Encoding and Decoding
Encoding and decoding through the CMS Lite implementation is done through two
functions, CMS-LiteEncode(CMSContentInfo *message) and CMSLiteDecode(CMSContentInfo
*message, STACKOF(CMSRecipientInf o)*recipients) LiteEncode takes normal CMS mes-
sages stored in message and returns a LiteData structure which is the encoded
message. LiteDecode takes the encoded message and a stack of X.509 [37] certifi-
cates which represent the possible recipients of the message and decodes the message
into a normal CMS message. Encoding and decoding functions are all written into
CRYPTO/CMS/CMSLITE.C.
Because each CMS contentType is very different in its makeup compared to other
CMS contentTypes, each structure must have a separate encoding and decoding
function. We implement the changes described in section 4.5.3 using the ASN.1
functions that are defined for each ASN.1 data type. We use these functions to
allocate and set the values for the CMS Lite ASN.1 structures.
SignedData
For SignedData we copy any content over from the CMS structure and allocate
and define a Signed-params structure. Each SignerInfo in the normal structure
is handled separately by the function CMSSignernfo-params_init. It converts all the
normal structure's SignerInf o structures into SignerInf o-params structures, elim-
inating overhead for each structure. Below we give the code snippets for encoding
and decoding SignedData.
CMSLiteData *CMSLiteEncode-Signed
(CMSContentInfo *message, CMSContentInfo *cms)
{
CMSSignedData *sd;
CMSLiteData *ld;
CMSSigned-params *sp;
ASN1_OCTETSTRING **data;
int ret;
sd = message->d.signedData;
// Create the LiteData structure and set pointers to it
ld = cmsLiteDatacreate(cms);
sp = cmsLiteSign.create(ld);
// Replace the contentType object with an integer.
sp->contentType =
(encodeAlgorithm(sd->encapContentInfo->eContentType)
<< CMSCONTENTTYPESHIFT);
sp->version = sd->version;
data = CMS-getOcontent(message);
// Allocate and copy the data from the SignedData
if (sp->eContent)
{
MASN1_OCTETSTRINGfree(sp->eContent);
sp->eContent = MASN1_OCTETSTRINGnew();
}
else
{
sp->eContent = MASN1_OCTETSTRINGnewo;
}
ASN1_STRINGset(sp->eContent, (*data)->data,
(*data)->length);
// Transform each SignerInfo into SignerInfo-params
ret = cmsSignerInfo-params-init(sd,sp);
if (ret==O)
goto mallerr;
// return a pointer to the LiteData part of the
// created CMS message
return cms->d.liteData;
}
Listing 5.7: Encoding SignedData
int cmsSignerInfo-params-init(CMSSignedData *sd,
CMSSigned-params *sp)
{
STACKOF(CMSSignerInfo) *sis;
STACKOF(CMSSignernfoparams) *sps;
CMSSignerlnfo *si;
CMSSignerInfo-params *sip;
X509_ATTRIBUTE *attr;
X509_ATTRIBUTE *dup;
int i;
int digestParam = 0;
int signParam = 0;
sis = sd->signerInfos;
sps = sp->signerInfos;
// Iterate through the stack of SignerInfo
for (i=0;i<skCMSSignerInfo-num(sis);i++)
{
// Stack accessing functions
si = skCMSSignerInfo-value(sis,i);
// ASN.1 allocation for the new type made possible
// by DECLAREASN1_ITEM(CMSSignerInfo-params)
sip = MASN1_new-of(CMSSignerInfo-params);
// store the hash of the issuer and serial number
sip->sidHash =
cms-getSignerIdentifier-hash(si->sid,EVP-md5());
sip->type = si->sid->type;
... Copy over the signature ...
// Encode the signature and digest algorithms
// into integers, which are combined later
signParam =
encodeAlgorithm(si->signatureAlgorithm->algorithm);
digestParam =
encodeAlgorithm(si->digestAlgorithm->algorithm);
// Bit shifts the data to store both parameters
// in one integer
sip->parameter = (signParam <<
CMSSIGNATUREALGSHIFT) +
(digestParam << CMSDIGESTALG.SHIFT);
... copy over signed attributes here ...
// Push the new structure onto the
SignedData-params
if (!skCMSSignerInfo-params-push(sps,sip)
... deallocate if failure ...
}
return 1;
}
Listing 5.8: Encoding SignedData continued
int CMS.LiteDecodeSigned(CMSContentInfo *message,
CMSContentInfo *cms, STACKOF(X509) *recipients)
{
CMSLiteData *ld;
CMSSigned-params *sp;
CMS.SignedData *sd;
STACKOF(CMSSignerInfo-params) *sips;
CMSSignerInfo-params *sip;
CMSSignerInfo *si;
int i,ret = 0;
int contenttype =0;
... allocate all the data structures ...
// find the contentType from the parameter
contenttype = (sp->contentType & CMSCONTENTTYPEMASK) >
CMSCONTENTTYPESHIFT;
sd->encapContentInfo->eContentType =
getContentTypeFromParam(contenttype);
... copy over the encapsulated data ...
sips = sp->signerInfos;
// Iterate through the SignerInfo-params
// to recreate SignerInfos
for (i=O;i< skCMSSignerInfo-params-num(sips);i++)
{
sip = skCMSSignerInfo-params-value(sips,i);
si = MASN1_new-of(CMSSignerInfo);
ret = cmsliteDecode-signer(sip, si, recipients,
sd);
}
ret 1;
return ret;
}
Listing 5.9: Decoding Signed-params
int cms-liteDecode-signer(CMSSignerInfo-params *sip,
CMSSignerInfo *si, STACKOF(X509) *signers, CMSSignedData *sd)
{
X509 *recip = NULL;
X509_ATTRIBUTE *attr;
X509_ATTRIBUTE *dup;
X509_ALGOR *alg;
int digestAlg = -1;
int signatureAlg = -1;
int i;
// Compare our certificates signerIdentifier hashes
// against the one in the message. Returns the certificate
// which matches
if ((recip = cmp-issuer-andserial(signers,
sip->sidHash)) == NULL)
return 0;
... copy over the signerIdentifer data from the
certificate...
... copy over the signature here ...
// get the digest and signature algorithms
// from the parameter
digestAlg = (sip->parameter & CMSDIGESTALGMASK)>>
CMSDIGESTALGSHIFT;
signatureAlg = (sip->parameter & CMSSIGNATUREALGMASK) >>
CMSSIGNATUREALGSHIFT;
si->digestAlgorithm = getDigestFromParam(digestAlg);
si->signatureAlgorithm =
getSignatureAlgFromParam(signatureAlg);
... copy over the signed attributes ...
... push the digest algorithms on the stack ...
return 1;
}
Listing 5.10: Decode Signed-params continued
EnvelopedData
In order to decode and encode the EnvelopedData structure, we use the ASN.1
functions just like we did in encoding and decoding SignedData. Again, we flat-
ten the normal data structure, taking out the encrypted data. However, we found
that we needed to simply copy over the contentEncryptionAlgorithm from the nor-
mal structure to the encryptAlg data field instead of creating a parameter for it.
This is because, the contentEncryptionAlgorithm stores the initialization vector
for symmetric encryption algorithms if one is needed. In encoding and decoding
EnvelopedData, the RecipientInfo structures are handled separately through the
function CMSLiteEnvelopedRecipient-init. We again include some functions as we did
for SignedData in Listings 5.11 and 5.12.
CMSLiteData *CMSLiteEncodeEnveloped
(CMSContentInfo *message, CMSContentInfo *cms)
{
CMSLiteData *ld;
CMSEnvelopedData *env;
CMSEnveloped-params *envparams;
ASNIOCTETSTRING **data;
int keytransencrypt = 0;
int symmetrickey = 0;
int encryptedcontent = 0;
if (cms->d.other == NULL)
{
... allocate the structures and set the pointers ...
// Copy the encryption algorithm to encryptAlg
envparams->encryptAlg = X509_ALGOR-dup
(env->encryptedContentInfo->
contentEncryptionAlgorithm);
// table lookup for the algorithms used
symmetrickey = encodeAlgorithm(env->
encryptedContentInfo ->contentEncryptionAlgorithm->
algorithm);
encryptedcont ent
= encodeAlgorithm(env->encryptedContentInfo->
contentType);
... copy encrypted data over
// Copy appropriate data from the message recipient
// infos to the litedata infos
// Only handles KeyTransport recipient infos as OPENSSL
// doesnt handle anything but this type as well.
cmsLiteEnvelopedRecipient-init(message,
envparams,&keytransencrypt);
// set the version and the parameter for
// enveloped lite data
envparams->version = env->version;
envparams->parameter = (encryptedcontent<<
CMSCONTENTTYPESHIFT) +
(keytransencrypt << CMSKEYTRANSPORTSHIFT)
return cms->d.liteData;
}
}
Listing 5.11: Encoding EnvelopedData
int cmsLiteEnvelopedRecipient-init(CMSContentInfo *cms,
CMSEnveloped-params *envparams, int *enc)
{
STACKOF(CMSRecipientlnfo) *ris;
STACKOF(CMSRecipientparams) *rps;
CMSRecipientInfo *ri;
CMSRecipient-params *rp;
CMSKeyTransParams *ktp;
CMSKeyTransRecipientInfo *ktri;
int i;
... set up the pointers ...
for (i O;i < skCMS.RecipientInfo-num(ris); i++)
{
ri = skCMSRecipientInfo.value(ris, i);
ktri = ri->d.ktri;
rp = M_ASN1_new-of(CMSRecipientparams);
rp->d.ktp = M_ASN1_new-of(CMSKeyTransParams);
ktp = rp->d.ktp;
ktp->version = ktri->version;
rp->type = CMSRECIPINFO.TRANS;
// get the hash for the signeridentifier (md5)
ktp->sidHash =
cmsgetSignerIdentifierhash(ktri->rid,EVPmd5());
... set the type of the signerIdentifier
... copy the encrypted key over ...
// replace the encryption algorithm with an
integer
if (enc)
*enc = encodeAlgorithm(ktri->
keyEncryptionAlgorithm->algorithm);
... push the lite recipient parameter on the
stack
}
return 1;
Listing 5.12: Encoding EnvelopedData continued
Other CMS types
The same concepts were applied to the other CMS contentTypes in order to encode
and decode to and from those types into a LiteData structure. We will not include
code snippets from those because their structures are similar, and in some cases,
more simple. We did not attempt to encode and decode the AuthenticatedData
structure into CMS Lite. This was because the OpenSSL implementation of the
CMS library did not have a function to create AuthenticatedData. The encode and
decode functions for the CompressedData, DigestedData, and EncryptedData types
is in CRYPTO/CMS/CMSLITE.C.
5.3.4 Summary of CMS Lite
We updated the CMS API to enable it to transform normal CMS structures into Lite
structures and back again. We added restrictions with this Lite type by limiting algo-
rithms and hashing the issuer name and serial numbers identifying X.509 certificates.
In order to decode the CMS Lite structure we check all our known certificates to find
the one that corresponds to each issuer name and serial number. We also were limited
by the implementation of the CMS in OpenSSL. Not all the functions and types in
the latest CMS RFC [35] are implemented in OpenSSL; Only one key management
technique is implemented and there is no function to created the AuthenticatedData
data type. However, our extended CMS Lite implementation decodes and encodes all
the structures supported by OpenSSL.
Chapter 6
Evaluation
In the previous chapter, we described extensions that incorporate ZLIB compression
with preplaced dictionaries and a new CMS Lite type into the OpenSSL library. We
included code snippets and discussed which OpenSSL APIs supported the implemen-
tation.
This chapter describes a performance evaluation of how CMS Lite and ZLIB dic-
tionary compression affect CMS message size. To show our results, we first detail our
test infrastructure and our test data. We then compare the optimization methods
against each other, discuss results, and assess their message size overheads as men-
tioned in section 4.1. Finally, we offer conclusions and recommendations on using
these methods to optimize CMS.
6.1 Testing Infrastructure
In order to encrypt and sign messages using CMS, a sender and a recipient must
be defined. In many cases, entities sending and receiving messages use the PKI in
order to attach cryptographic information to a user's identity. Public key certificates
are generated for every entity that wishes to participate in signed and/or encrypted
communications. The OpenSSL CMS API uses X.509 certificates to sign or encrypt
EnvelopedData, SignedData, EncryptedData, and AuthenticatedData. Thus, in
order to test the performance of our API extensions, we used X.509 certificates for
dummy entities created using a plugin developed for the program Pidgin [10].
We also needed a method for storing and retrieving certificates during test runs.
Authenticated Statement Exchange (ASE) uses a database for each user to store
previously transmitted certificates along with other information, so we included it in
our software implementation.
Finally, we needed a platform on which to create and use the CMS API. Since
ASE also uses OpenSSL in order to perform cryptographic operations, we leveraged
ASE to access user information and use our CMS API by writing a custom CMS API
wrapper for ASE.
6.2 Test Methodology
To test our CMS Lite and preplaced dictionary methods, we first created different
types of CMS messages using OpenSSL's standard CMS API. Table 6.1 shows which
functions were used to create the different types. All the functions and algorithms
we used can be found in CRYPTO/CMS/CMS.H in OpenSSL.
For EnvelopedData tests, we sent an enveloped message to each of our dummy
users: Alice, Bob, Carol, Eve, and Mallory. Each message contained one recipientInf o
structure with a key encrypted to the user. The average size of these messages was
used as the measurement for EnvelopedData messages. Similarly, for SignedData
messages we made structures signed by each dummy user and again averaged the
optimization results. After the normal CMS structures were created, we used the
i2d-CMS-bio function discussed in section 4.4.4 to DER encode the structures. Then,
we used the various preplaced dictionaries described in section 4.3 to compress these
packages.
To test CMS Lite, we encoded the CMS structures in CMS Lite and then used
i2dCMS-bio to DER encode the CMS Lite structure. The size of the DER encoded
message was used as the message size. We additionally decoded the CMS structure
and ensured that the encapsulated data sent inside the package was intact and that
the CMS structure that was recreated could be used in the same manner as the
CMS structure Function used Algorithms Used
EnvelopedData CMSencrypt(STACK..0F(X509) *certs, Key Transport mode-RSA
BIO *in, const EVPCIPHER *cipher, Encryption, AES-256-CBC
unsigned int flags) mode
SignedData CMS-sign(X509 *signcert, EVP_PKEY RSA-Signatures, SHA-1 di-
*pkey, STACKOF(X509) *certs, BIO gest
*data, unsigned int flags)
DigestedData CMS-digest-create(BIO *in, const SHA-1 digest
EVP_MD *md, unsigned int flags)
EncryptedData CMS-EncryptedData-create(BIO *in, AES-256-CBC mode
const EVP-CIPHER *cipher, unsigned
int flags)
CompressedData *CMS-compress(BIO *in, int comp-nid, ZLIB compression
unsigned int flags)
Table 6.1: Functions used to create CMS messages
original.
We also tested our ideal and worst-case conditions. The ideal conditions we sim-
ulated by creating the same type of CMS message with differing payloads and com-
pressing those messages one at a time without flushing the dictionary in between.
We simulated the worst case conditions by simply using ZLIB compression without
any previous messages or a preplaced dictionary. For both these tests, the structures
were DER encoded.
6.3 Results
6.3.1 Dictionary Comparisons
We now compare ZLIB with preplaced dictionaries to CMS Lite. First, Figure 6-1
shows the ZLIB compression savings when using different dictionaries.
The compression savings are greatest for SignedData and EnvelopedData mes-
sages. The best dictionary in compression was one created by concatenating the full
CMS structures with root certificates. The worst dictionary at compression was the
one containing CMS strings taken from full structures, though its performance is very
close to the others.
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Figure 6-1: ZLIB compression comparing dictionaries
We then accounted for the 256 byte CEK, 256 byte signature, message payload,
and 16 byte digest which all must be recreated perfectly to preserve CMS functionality.
Since the rest of the CMS structure acts as metadata, we called it message overhead.
We found that the best dictionary was compressing 270 bytes of overhead to 85 bytes
in SignedData and 200 bytes to 85 bytes in EnvelopedData. These represent a savings
of nearly 190 bytes per message. The worst dictionary still resulted in a savings of
170 bytes for SignedData and 70 bytes for EnvelopedData. Figure 6-2 shows these
overhead sizes.
We also show the percentage of the non-CEK/signature/digest related overhead
which is compressed by each dictionary. Figure 6-3 shows the best dictionary, Full
+ Certs, was able to compress nearly 70% of SignedData overhead and 60% of
EnvelopedData overhead. Table B.2 in Appendix B shows the full data results for
dictionary compression.
6.3.2 CMS Lite Comparsion
We also show the effect that the CMS Lite optimizations had on the message size
of the structures. CMS Lite achieves some message overhead compression on all
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Figure 6-2: Overhead comparison after compression w/dictionaries
CMS structures. The largest reduction in message size occurs with SignedData and
EnvelopedData structures. CMS Lite reduces 120 bytes of SignedData overhead and
100 bytes of EnvelopedData overhead. These results are shown in Figures 6-4 and
6-5 and in Table B.4 in Appendix B.
We also show in Table 6.2 the percentage compression of the non-key/signature/digest
overhead for each CMS structure.
SignedData EnvelopedData DigestedData CompressedData EncryptedData
43.1 48.9 67.4 12.2 27.5
Table 6.2: CMS Lite overhead compression percentage
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Figure 6-3: Overhead percentage compression w/dictionaries
6.3.3 Total Results
We finally compared the best dictionary results to the tests simulating the ideal and
worst-case conditions. We expect to fall somewhere in between these two results,
but hope to be closer to the ideal. We also compare CMS Lite to these results
as well. We chose to only show the SignedData and EnvelopedData structures as
these contained the most significant savings throughout the study. As you can see
in Figure 6-6 the original messages do benefit from ZLIB compression without any
optimizations. However, the added dictionary produces results closer to the ideal
conditions test. CMS Lite performed better than ZLIB without a dictionary, but
ZLIB with a preplaced CMS dictionary performed better than CMS Lite. In Figure 6-
7 we see that the overhead reduction due to ZLIB compression and CMS Lite in fact
is nearly the compression achieved with best case conditions. Overhead reduction
using ZLIB without a dictionary is less than 30 bytes for EnvelopedData and less
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Figure 6-4: CMS Lite optimizations
than 70 bytes for SignedData, however it increases to 110 and 190 bytes respectively
with a good preplaced dictionary. The full data set of results is available in Appendix
B.
6.4 Discussion
In this section we discuss why we saw the results above and evaluate the different
methods of optimizing CMS according to the requirements of each solution to be
recoverable, flexible, extensible, and simple as described in section 4.3.
6.4.1 ZLIB with Dictionary Compression
Adding a preplaced CMS dictionary allows ZLIB to use references to previously loaded
data, allowing for better compression. We found that the best dictionary used was
one with full CMS structures and certificates concatenated as described in section
4.4.4. The full CMS structures have all the structures which are sent to the user,
Figure 6-5: CMS Lite overhead size
allowing ZLIB to reference rather than output strings '. To further reduce messsage
size, the preplaced dictionary could be optimized for CMS structures by aligning the
dictionary strings in more efficient ways for ZLIB to find and reference them.
Using a dictionary with ZLIB compression does add a problem in message recov-
erability. To use a dictionary with ZLIB compression, all message recipients must
possess the exact dictionary used during compression. They must also determine
which of the many possible dictionaries to use in uncompressing the CMS structure.
However, since a dictionary is a long-lived, public data item, it could be preplaced or
downloaded from a network accessible repository and referenced by a unique identifier
sent with the CMS message.
Since ZLIB compression does not affect the contents of the CMS data, it is flexible
with any changes that occur in CMS. In terms of extensibility, if CMS is extended,
'We expect the actual performance of the dictionary to be a few bytes worse than the best
dictionary's performance as we used messages sent to dummy user Alice in order to create the
dictionary and also used Alice in testing the dictionary. Thus, we were able to re-use some of her
certificate identifying information, which would not be possible if a canonical dictionary was used
by all users.
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Figure 6-6: All optimizations compared to best and worst case conditions
then a new dictionary can be optimized for the changed structures. The only problems
would arise in distributing the new dictionary to all participants in optimized CMS
communications.
Implementing the ZLIB optimization was simple. Our extensions to the OpenSSL
implementation of CompressedData required only about 350 lines of code change.
Building the dictionary was not too difficult either. We implemented custom functions
to extract literals from each CMS structure, which required around 300 lines of code
change. We then were able to use the CMS library functions to create the CMS
structures for the dictionary. To get certificates, we easily downloaded certificates
from our dummy store and from the Mozilla web browser and the DoD root certificate
webpage. We assembled the combinations of dictionaries quickly with cat.
6.4.2 CMS Lite
CMS Lite was able to transform normal CMS structures and save data by eliminating
specifiers for certificates, objects, and algorithms while replacing them with shortened
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Figure 6-7: All optimizations overhead sizes
parameter values. One optimization that reduced a significant amount of overhead
was replacing certificate's issuer name and serial numbers with a SHA-1 hash of their
combination. This eliminated around 60 bytes of overhead, but also presented further
challenges. Because of this change, CMS Lite messages do not enable the recipient
to identify the certificates used in the message. However, if the recipients have all
the certificates used in the message, then they can iterate through their certificates
to find the ones in the message. We also believe that CMS Lite could be further
optimized, reducing message size. This could be done by reducing more of the data
in CMS Lite into a parameter by using stricter guidelines what configurations can be
used.
CMS Lite can be fully recoverable just like ZLIB compression, however adding
extra attributes to CMS structures unknown to CMS Lite would not result in these
attributes being reduced in size. Also, because CMS Lite supports a reduced set of
configurations, some optional data in CMS may not be recoverable after being trans-
formed to CMS Lite. In terms of flexibility, CMS Lite can support any algorithms
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with some modifications and can be extended to support any changes to CMS. These
changes would take more implementation work than creating a new dictionary, how-
ever. CMS Lite is simple in concept, but can be more difficult to code in OpenSSL
as we had to deal with ASN.1 parsing and more OpenSSL code.
6.4.3 Wrap Up
We showed the results for both CMS and CMS Lite and then compared the two
methodologies according to our requirements. Table 6.3 shows these results.
Requirement ZLIB w/dictionary CMS Lite
Recoverability high - must distribute dictionary medium - CMS Lite must be
used to decode the message and
some optional data not recovered
Flexibility high - does not depend highly on low - can only support subset of
CMS options used to CMS algorithms and options
Extensibility medium - new updates to CMS medium - Can support any up-
can be incorporated into a new dates to CMS, but must change
dictionary CMS Lite to implement these
changes
Simplicity high - dictionary must be present medium - implementation of all
with both sender and recipient changes in OpenSSL
Table 6.3: Evaluating ZLIB compression w/dictionary and CMS Lite
6.5 Conclusion
Both CMS Lite and ZLIB compression offer benefits over simple ZLIB compression
in a disadvantaged network. Our use of general purpose compression with preplaced
dictionaries reduced overhead by 110 bytes per EnvelopedData message, nearly 60%
of the overhead. For SignedData the overhead was reduced by 190 bytes for a 70%
compression ratio. This was only about 30 bytes less reduction than the optimal
compression test assuming a non-disadvantaged network. CMS Lite also performed
respectably, achieving a 48% compression ratio for overhead on EnvelopedData struc-
tures and 43% compression ration for SignedData structures. In comparison, general
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compression without our optimizations only compressed 30 bytes of overhead for
EnvelopedData messages and 60 bytes for SignedData messages, resulting in com-
pression ratios of 14 and 23 percent respectively.
However, both methods have a couple of drawbacks. ZLIB compression with a
dictionary requires the dictionary to be preplaced to compress and uncompress the
message. CMS Lite requires a complex implementation at the message sender and
recipient. Both could be implemented with a proxy in between users as shown in
Figure 4-7. However, because of its greater simplicity, flexibility, and recoverability
we believe ZLIB compression with preplaced dictionaries to be a better solution. ZLIB
compression may be optimized further by improving the placement of CMS strings
in the dictionary while CMS Lite could be improved by creating strict configurations
which flatten CMS more and combine more CMS algorithms and content types into
a parameter. Although ZLIB compression with a dictionary may be a better solution
in our study, CMS Lite is worth exploring, as it does offer a possibility of the best
message overhead compression.
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Chapter 7
Extensible Messaging and Presence
Protocol (XMPP) Optimizations
for Disadvantaged Networks
In the previous chapters we discussed the implementation of ZLIB general purpose
compression with a prepended dictionary in OpenSSL as well as the implementation
of a content-aware compression CMS structure, CMS Lite. We discussed the testing
infrastructure we set up to examine these optimizations and compared the results
that these optimizations had on reducing the size of CMS messages.
We now describe a self-contained chapter which again follows our goals outlined in
Chapter 1. We again attempt to optimize standardized message protocols for secure
group communications. However, we now transition to another standardized form
of communication, XMPP [52]. XMPP is an XML-based protocol derived from the
open source Jabber protocol. XMPP has been adopted as a message packing protocol
in the open source community using XML stanzas to deliver chat, video, and other
content. We explore XMPP because although CMS can be used to create crypto-
graphic structures, we wished transfer our standard optimizations and extensions to
a higher layer, to enable standard cryptographically packaged information to be used
on disadvantaged networks in applications such as chat.
To optimize XMPP for secure group communications in disadvantaged networks,
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this chapter offers methods to mitigate these problems by extending XMPP to en-
able and optimize the passing of group end-to-end secure messages and adding an
optimization to reduce the overhead of setting up secure group communications on
XMPP. We wrote and implemented specifications to package group-encryption data
and authenticating information via XMPP. These optimizations and protocol addi-
tions can be used on a XMPP chat client and a XMPP chat server, but can also be
extended to any client and server which implements the XML and XMPP standards.
These changes present a standardized method for passing group secure messages and
metadata in XMPP and reduce the amount of XMPP overhead. We present these
changes as another example of an optimization to a standardized message structure
for secure group communications on disadvantaged networks.
7.1 Motivation
Normally, secure communications in chat programs have been accomplished through
TLS connections created between server and user and from server to server [30].
However, the cost of establishing TLS connections can be be to high in networks with
low bandwidth, high latency, and intermittant connectivity. This is because a TLS
handshake must be performed from every server to server and user to server link.
One way of mitigating the costs of encryption on disadvantaged networks is
through the use of end-to-end encryption. When encryption is accomplished at the
endpoints, the encrypted messages can be sent from server to server without estab-
lishing costly TLS connections. Also, with end-to-end security, no servers can access
the content of the messages, only members in the encryption groups, adding another
layer of security to the communications.
Currently XMPP has a specification for sending end-to-end encrypted messages
from one user to another singular user [51]. There is no current standard for the use
of group end-to-end messages in XMPP or in other protocols, which leads to inef-
ficient implementation of end-to-end encryption with XMPP. Also, the mechanisms
for sending XMPP messages to different users are not as efficient as they could be,
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especially when sending information needed to make encryption possible.
7.2 XMPP Background
XMPP's core was invented in 1998 and refined by the Jabber open-source community.
It is based on XML structures and used to send real-time data. Although the core was
defined in 2004 by IETF standards, the protocol is continually updated through the
XMPP Standards Foundation (XSF) by means of XMPP Extensions. The core pro-
tocol has been updated to include instant messaging, presence protocols, multimedia
streams, encrypted streams, and the sending of XML data [52].
The closest extensions available to send secure group messages are the end-to-
end encryption extension [51], the S/MIME Encryption [47] protocol for XMPP,
and the use of XML streams and TLS within XMPP [30]. However, none of these
schemes are optimized for disadvantaged networks as they require multiple rounds of
communication for TLS and XML streams and the sending of multiple certificates in
S/MIME.
7.3 XMPP Extensions
XMPP Extension Protocols (XEPs) are the way that XMPP is extended with new
capabilities. As of August 17, 2009 there were 271 extensions proposed to XMPP.
To enable efficient group security, we propose two XMPP extensions, one for group
end-to-end encryption and the other for subset addressing in multi-user chat. Draft
extensions can be submitted according to the policy defined by the XMPP Standards
Foundation to the XMPP Extensions Editor. They gain approval through the XMPP
Council after a community driven approval and implementation process [18].
To extend XMPP to support group end-to-end encryption, we recognized the
requirements for group encryption protocols and then develop a protocol on XMPP
that satisfies these requirements. For subset addressing we identify the shortcomings
with the current multi-user chat protocol and define ways to increase its efficiency.
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7.3.1 Secure Group Messages Requirements
A group encryption protocol must achieve security through confidentiality, integrity,
and authentication while also being interoperable and efficient. These qualities are
defined below.
Confidentiality
Any member in the current chatroom and in the current encryption group must
be able to decrypt and view a message sent to the chatroom. Each user may create
encryption groups depending on who they wish to encrypt messages. Entities without
membership to the encryption group of a message must not be able to decrypt the
messages even if they are a member of the chatroom. Encrypting to existing chatroom
membership might be a reasonable approach to maintaining confidentiality. In some
cases, it might be desirable to include a server in the group. In those cases, the server
could include itself in the chatroom membership as a user and users could choose to
include the server in encryption groups just as they would include other users.
Integrity
The integrity of each message sent in an end-to-end encryption protocol is important
because the transmission medium between the endpoints of each message is expected
to be insecure. If no integrity checks are made, an attacker can modify the contents of
a sent message in order to compromise the security of the encrypted communications.
A message digest such as (SHA-1/2, MD5, etc.) [45] [48] should be included in the
message in order to verify the integrity of the message.
Authentication
Each party to a conversation must have some method to cryptographically verify
the authenticity of a message (note that this does not preclude the source from be-
ing anonymous, nor the source from being any member of a particular group, i.e.,
group-authentication). Such authentication requires that users share cryptographic
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material. In groups, users could accomplish this by authenticating to every other user
separately. We use the sample users Alice, Bob, Carol, and Dave all participating in
a secure group chatroom to illustrate: (Alice must authenticate to Bob, Carol, and
Dave) and (Bob must authenticate to Alice, Carol, and Dave). Users alternatively
could choose to delegate authentication to other entities (other users/servers).
A database may be used in order to store authentication information and to store
bindings between XMPP IDs and identifying information. There is a problem of ver-
ifying that a digital identity corresponds to a real, valid, trusted user. Group encryp-
tion protocols may rely on public key infrastructures, webs-of-trust, key-continuity,
and/or any other mechanism to provide such assurances.
Flexibility
The protocol must be upgradeable given the changing nature of cryptographic algo-
rithms. It must also support the real time exchange of keying material, bindings, and
IDs.
Efficiency
In group encryption, efficiency can be difficult to achieve. The communications vol-
ume is larger as group cryptographic data structures must be distributed to a larger
number of participants, resulting in an increase in messages needed to be sent. Group
distribution of these cryptographic data structures also adds more communication
overhead per message than user-to-user encryption. These problems are compounded
by the fact that whenever a new member joins or leaves an encryption group, new
keys may have to be distributed. While these problems may be not as important
on a wired high-bandwidth, low latency network, our group encryption mechanisms
must take into account low-bandwidth, high latency networks and implement efficient
group encryption schemes.
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7.3.2 Secure Group Protocol
To satisfy the requirements for secure group messages, a secure group protocol has
three parts. The first part is a group encryption scheme for binding cryptographic IDs
to application IDs and performing end-to-end encryption to create secure messages.
The second part is a scheme for exchanging cryptographic information necessary to
accomplish encryption, and the third is a secure message format to send the data.
Group Encryption Schemes
A group encryption scheme encompasses methods which are used to pass encrypted
data in between entities and dynamically rekey users as encryption-group member-
ships change. A scheme is needed to provide group end-to-end security. This scheme
defines methods encryption groups use to rekey and the exact mechanisms and al-
gorithms by which encrypted data is passed. One sample group end-to-end security
scheme is S/MIME [47]. Another developed specifically for disadvantaged networks
by Lincoln Laboratory is GROK.
Bootstrapping Secure Group Communications
When a client enables group encryption in a chatroom, a separate protocol is needed
for exchanging information with other clients supporting group encryption in the
room. The client may need to exchange public keys, name-key bindings or other
information (methods used to distribute new keys to a group, supported encryp-
tion/signature algorithms, etc). Clients may automatically send this information
when entering a group, or may wait until it is requested by other members in the
encryption group. For XMPP, there is no specified method of sending this needed
authentication information, though the information may be packaged in any manner,
including CMS.
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Secure Messaging Process and Format
In order for plugin software to encrypt a message to a group of users we propose a
protocol which uses a ge2e element to specify secure group communications. The
entire process is shown in Figure 7-1 and given as an example of a group message
created by OpenSSL and sent via an XMPP client. We detail the process and format
next.
7. XMPP unwraps text and displays it
6. XMPP plugin emits signal to decrypt text
mesg
Recipient
unwrap
decrypt
5. Message forwarded to
recipient
4. Message is sent
to XMPP server
encrypt Sender
3. XMPP wraps encrypted text
2. XMPP plugin emits signal to encrypt text
1. Sender inputs text
Figure 7-1: XMPP group secure message sending process
First, the XMPP plugin encrypts the message using the encryption scheme of the
user's choosing. Next the encrypted message is encoded in base-64 for text output to
be sent.
Text: Testing the encrypted message system.
=> < - - encrypted text plus any necessary headers-- >
=> < -- base-64 encoded encrypted text -- >
111
....... .
The encrypted and base-64 encoded payload is enclosed in text element in the ge2e
element whose attribute of encrypt tells what encryption scheme to use. This at-
tribute specifies the group encryption scheme used to handle the inside text. This
encompasses steps 1-3 in Figure 7-1. The message is passed from server to server in
steps 4 and 5 until it reaches the destination client. Clients decrypt a message by
first recognizing a ge2e element and then passing it to the group encryption process
specified by the encrypt attribute in the text element as shown in steps 6 and 7 in
Figure 7-1. The following listings show a sample XMPP chat protocol message with
our extension. In this example, we use the group encryption scheme GROK.
<message
From=alice~example.com/laptop
To=chat@conference.example.com
Type=groupchat>
<ge2e xmlns=urn:xmpp:tmp:ge2e>
<text encrypt=grok>
<![CDATA[---encrypted message---]]>
</text>
</ge2e>
</message>
The server forwards the message to all group members using the multi-user chat
protocol [19] and ignores the ge2e element unless it's a group member.
// Alice sends a ge2e message to the chatroom containing
// herself and Dave
<message
from=chat@conference.example.com/alice
to=bob@example.com/pda
type=group chat>
<ge2e xmlns=urn:xmpp:tmp:ge2e>
<text encrypt=ge2e>
<![CDATA[---encrypted message---]]>
</text>
</ge2e>
</message>
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// The chatroom forwards the message to both users
// without dealing with the encrypted data
<message
from=chat(conference.example.com/alice
to=alice~example.com/laptop
type=groupchat
<ge2e xmlns=urn:xmpp:tmp:ge2e>
<text encrypt=grok >
<![CDATA[---encrypted message---]]>
</text>
</ge2e>
</message>
// The chatroom forwards the message to Dave
<message
from=chat@conference.example.com/alice
to=dave@jabber.org/desktop
type=group chat>
<ge2e xmlns=urn:xmpp:tmp:ge2e>
<text encrypt=groupEncrypt>
<![CDATA[---encrypted message---]]>
</text>
</ge2e>
</message>
Listing 7.1: Sending a secure group message to a XMPP chatroom
In some cases, clients may not be able to decrypt a message received in the chat-
room. This may occur if the message is not encrypted to them. The response of the
receiving client depends on the group encryption scheme used in sending the message.
However, the recipient may choose to ignore the message or show a identifier saying
an indecipherable message was sent to the recipient. The recipient may also choose
to send a response to the sender.
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7.3.3 Subset Addressing
We created another XMPP optimization to help efficiency and functionality of XMPP
in disadvantaged networks by reducing the amount of data needed to be sent. The ex-
tension allows servers to forward messages sent to a subset of users in a chatroom and
requires changes to how XMPP chat clients and servers handle group chat messages.
Problem Description
Subset addressing is the ability to send a message to a subset of the users in a
chatroom without having to create a new conversation with those users. In XMPP
multi-user chat the chat server normally forwards all messages to all room members,
but in some cases, messages are only intended for a subset of the room membership.
This means unneeded messages can be sent and bandwidth unnecessarily used. One
example of this problem can occur during secure group chat. When a secure group is
a subset of the room membership, secure group membership changes, and the group
encryption scheme needs to distribute a new key to the new secure group, messages
may need to be sent to a subset of users in the chatroom. Using the subset extension,
the server saves network bandwidth transmissions by eliminating rekey messages to
those not in the secure group in the chatroom and by not creating new conversations
for every user in the secure group membership.
Subset Addressing Usage
Subset addressing also supports other capabilities. For example, subset addresssing
can also function as a limited form of security as an ad-hoc secure group can be formed
by messaging to a specific subset. Finally, subset addressing could be an interesting
social tool which could be used to exclude friends from conversations without their
knowledge, pass secrets, and to avoid confusing others when messages arent meant
for them. With slow or disadvantaged networks, and encryption, a user can use
subset addressing to send cryptographic information to only the subset of users in a
chatroom that need that data, thus eliminating the waste of copying a message to
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users who already have the information.
Sending a Subset-Addressed Message
In order to send messages to a subset of chatroom membership, a client includes
a subset attribute in the XMPP message element. The subset attribute lists user
nicknames delimited by the forward-slash symbol (/). If the list has no tilde symbol
(~) in front, then it specifies the subset of the members to whom the message should be
delivered; otherwise, it describes the members that should be excluded from receiving
the message.
<message from='alicecexample.com' to='test~chat.example.com'
type='groupchat subset=alice/bob/carol>
<html><body> Hello subset </body></html>
</message>
Listing 7.2: Test chatroom subset message from Alice
Listing 7.2 shows a message that Alice wants to send to Alice, Bob, and Carol,
but not Dave. The server test4chat.example.com parses the chat subset-addressed
message and copies it to Alice, Bob, and Carol. The subset attribute is dropped and
the original message is also dropped. The resulting messages shown in Listing 7.3
should look like normal messages from the Alice in the chatroom.
Example 1 cont:
<message from='test~chat.example.com/alice'
to='alice@example.com/desktop' type='groupchat'>
<body>Hello subset</body>
</message >
<message from='testochat.example.com/alice'
to='bob@example.com/desktop' type='groupchat >
<body>Hello subset</body>
</mes sage>
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<message from='test@chat.example.com/alice'
to='carol~example.com/desktop' type='groupchat '>
<body>Hello subset</body>
</message>
Listing 7.3: Resulting message sent to chatroom
A user can also send to a subset of people where the subset excludes certain nicknames.
Listing 7.4 shows an example where Alice sends a message to test@chat.example.com
now specifying to exclude Dave.
<message from='alice~example.com ' to='testcchat.example.com'
type='groupchat subset=~dave>
<html><body> Hello subset example 2</body></html>
</message>
Listing 7.4: Alice excluding Dave
The server would send the same copies of the message to the same users as in Listing
7.2. The exclusion list is more efficient to represent when the room membership is
greater than half the total members. The inclusion subset representation is more
efficient when the subset is less than half the room membership. The server ignores
any invalid subset names and any users who become members after a sender transmits
an exclusion list, but before a server parses a message, will receive the message.
Figure 7-2 shows how enabling subset addressing can help reduce the amount of
data sent on XMPP. Normal XMPP protocol in a chatroom creates a message for
all participants in the chatroom even when the message is intended for a subset of
the people in the chatroom. Thus, a message costs (n + 1) * m units, where n is the
number of people in the chatroom and m is the message size. However, with subset
addressing, a message costs (k + 1) * m where k is the size of the subset. Thus, we
save (k + 1)/(n + 1) units, which obviously depends on the subset size.
The other method of sending to this subset would be to create separate conver-
sations with each member. However, creating a new conversation requires has more
message overhead than the user's name in the subset listing.
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Figure 7-2: Message savings due to subset addressing
7.4 Implementation
We described two ways of optimizing XMPP to use group secure communications,
the use of ge2e elements to specify when group secure messages are sent and the use
of subset addressing.
7.4.1 Platform
We implemented our XMPP protocol extensions in the Pidgin chat client [10] and
the Openfire [9] chat server. We chose Pidgin and Openfire because previous work in
our research group built security extensions into the same software, the code for both
of these programs is available through open source projects, and these clients both
use the XMPP protocol to pass messages.
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7.4.2 Group Secure Message Plugins
Pidgin implements a robust plugin interface that enables developers to extend func-
tionality. The XMPP protocol is itself a type of plugin to the the LIBPURPLE message
passing library. LIBPURPLE is responsible for the low level implementation of gather-
ing user input and sending messages on the network while the XMPP plugin modifies
these messages to wrap its XMPP elements around user input. We use the XMPP
plugin interface because it allows Pidgin to benefit from any group security libraries
that can encrypt chat data sent in XMPP.
Signals
Pidgin's LIBPURPLE library interface allows for the sending of signals and attach-
ing handlers to signals, which is an implementation of events and event handlers
paradigm. We define an XMPP-specific signal that group secure plugins can connect
a handler to in order to encrypt communications.
purple-signal -register(plugin, "jabber-ge2e-encrypt",
purple-value-new(PURPLETYPEBOOLEAN), 5,
purple-value-new(PURPLETYPESUBTYPE,
PURPLESUBTYPECONVERSATION),
purple-value-newoutgoing(PURPLETYPESTRING),
purple-valuenewoutgoing(PURPLETYPESTRING),
purple-value-new-outgoing(PURPLETYPESTRING),
purple-valuenewoutgoing(PURPLETYPEENUM));
purplesignal-register(plugin, "jabber-ge2e-decrypt",
purplevaluenew(PURPLETYPEBOOLEAN), 4,
purplevaluenew(PURPLETYPESUBTYPE,
PURPLESUBTYPEACCOUNT),
purplevaluenew(PURPLETYPESTRING),
purplevaluenew(PURPLETYPESTRING),
purplevaluenew-outgoing(PURPLETYPESTRING));
Listing 7.5: Definition of the XMPP ge2e signal
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The Listing 7.5 shows code to register a signal called jabber-grok-encrypt and jabber-
grok-decrypt with pidgin and associated with the XMPP protocol plugin. The signal
takes arguments which contain pointers to the text data being sent in Pidgin as well
as the attributes that the ge2e message should have. This is defined in LIBPUR-
PLE/PROTOCOL/JABBER/LIBXMPP.C in the pidgin source. The encryption plugin
can then use purple-signai-connect to connect a handler function to these signals
which takes the input text data and encrypts or decrypts it before returning.
static gboolean
grok-encrypt-cb (PurpleConversation *conv,char **encrypt,
char **msg, char **u-msg, unsigned int *type, void *data)
{
assert (u-msg);
assert (conv);
assert (msg);
assert (data)
encryption
char *e;
PurpleAccount *account;
// Unencrypted message
// The current conversation
// Text being sent
// Memory structure for group
account = purple-conversation-get-account(conv);
assert (account);
Use group encryption plugin to encrypt
Store unencrypted messages in u-msg
(send-msg (conv, msg, u-msg, (grok-i-t
"chat") < 0)
msg
**) data,
if (*msg) {
free (*msg);
*msg = 0;
}
if (*u.msg){
free (*u-msg)
*umsg = 0;
}
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return FALSE;
// Sets the encrypt attribute for the ge2e element to
'grok '
// and the type of data to GE2E_TEXT
g-free(*encrypt);
e = "grok";
*encrypt = e;
*type = Ox1; // GE2E_TEXT = 1 DATA = 2
return TRUE;
Listing 7.6: Encryption signal handler
The encryption plugin callback shown in Listing 7.6 is connected in the implementa-
tion at PIDGIN/PLUGINS/GROK/SIGNAL-HANDLERS.C. It changes the message sent
to the signal and returns. Finally, we show in Listing 7.7 where the XMPP proto-
col calls the signal to potentially encrypt the sent chat data before wrapping XMPP
elements around the message and sending it on the network.
... In function: jabber-message-send-chat
// Emit the signal: emsg changed to encrypted text
// if signal is connected
jm->encryptOn = GPOINTERTOINT(
purple-signalemit-return_1(plugin,"jabber-ge2e-encrypt",
chat->conv,&encrypt,&emsg,&u-msg,&jm->g-type)
jm->g-encrypt = g.strdup(encrypt);
// If the message was encrypted and stored in emsg
// then wrap the emsg and send it.
if( jm->encryptOn == FALSE || !strcmp(emsg,msg))
{
if (emsg == NULL)
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return 0;
buf = g-strdupprintf ("<html
xmlns='http://jabber.org/protocol/xhtml-im'>
<body xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
s</body></html>", emsg);
}
purple-markup-htmlto-xhtml(buf, &jm->xhtml, &jm->body);
// Send the message adding XMPP elements then free it
jabber-message-send(jm);
jabber-message-free(jm);
Listing 7.7: XMPP Protocol emitting the signal to use group secure communications
Upon receiving the data, the process is reversed as the XMPP elements are parsed
and a signal is emitted to decrypt the data. The group secure communications plugin
catches the signal and decrypts to create plaintext. The text is then passed to the
functions that display data on the client's screen. The message encryption process is
detailed in Figure 7-3.
4. Send XMPP message
Input text
1. Input text to Pidgin
Figure 7-3: Detailing the implementation of the ge2e element in Pidgin
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7.4.3 Subset Implementation
Enabling subsets requires changes on both Pidgin, the XMPP client, and the XMPP
Server, which we chose to be an Openfire server [9]. On the client, we use a command
interface. We defined an XMPP command for XMPP subsets which fires if the user
chooses to send to a subset within the chatroom. As a reference implementation,
we implemented this like a chatroom command. If the user types /subset in their
chatroom window followed by the nicknames of the people to send the message to,
alice/bob/carol, then the message, Hello to only the subset, is sent to only
the subset of users. The Listing 7.8 shows the subset command being registered for
the XMPP protocol.
purple-cmdregister("subset", "ws", PURPLE_CMDPPRPL,
PURPLECMDFLAGCHAT I PURPLECMDFLAGPRPLONLY,
"prpl-jabber", jabber cmd_ chat subsetmsg,
_("subset &lt;subset list&gt; &lt;message&gt;
: Send a message to a subset of the room.
Subset list is a list of nicknames to
send to separated by '/' and preceded by '~
if it is a list of users to exclude."), NULL);
Listing 7.8: Registering a command for subsets in XMPP
This command signals the signal handler, j abber-cmd-chat-subsetmsg when-
ever the string /subset is typed into Pidgin while using XMPP. This signal handler
is detailed in Listing 7.9. Both these listings are in LIBPURPLE/PROTOCOLS/JAB-
BER/JABBER.C
static PurpleCmdRet jabber-cmdchatsubsetmsg
(PurpleConversation *conv, const char *cmd,
char **args, char **error, void *data)
{
JabberChat *chat = jabberchatfindby-conv(conv);
if (!chat)
return PURPLECMDRETFAILED;
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PurpleConnection *gc = purple-conversation-get-gc(conv);
JabberStream *js = gc->proto-data;
// Must have two arguments
if(args[O] == NULL || args[1] == NULL)
return PURPLECMD_RET_FAILED;
// The subset of user is the first argument
// and stored in js->subset
js->subset = args[0];
// The message is stored in args [11 and sent to
// the chatroom.
jabber-message-sendchat(gc, chat->id, args[1], 0);
js->subset = NULL;
return PURPLECMD_RETOK;
}
Listing 7.9: Subset command handler in XMPP
We modified XMPP to add the subset attribute to a message when the subset
command was given. The modified message is then sent to the Openfire XMPP
server, which parses the message in the call to processMessage. If there is a subset
of users to send to, processMessage in Listing 7.11 sends the message to the subset
of users specified by the subset attribute. Then in Listing 7.10 the server throws a
PacketRejectedException in interceptPacket to stop the message from being routed to
any other users connected to the chatroom. This protocol is located in the MUC-
SUBSETPLUGIN.JAVA file.
public void interceptPacket(Packet packet, Session session,
boolean read,
boolean processed) throws PacketRejectedException
{
// Create a copy of the packet
Packet original = packet.createCopy();
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boolean isMUCSubset = false;
if(m-pluginEnabled){
if (packet instanceof Message){
// process the message return
// true if it is a subset message
isMUCSubset =
processMessage((Message)packet, read);
}
// If not a subset forward as usual
if(!isMUCSubset){
packet = original;
}
// Drop the packet if it is a subset message
else{
throw new PacketRejectedException("message
dropped");
}
}
}
Listing 7.10: Subset message packet handling on the Openfire server
private boolean processMessage(Message message ,boolean read)
{
... declare variables
from = message.getFrom();
to = message.getTo();
... initialize variables ...
// Get the subset elements
subset = message.getElement().attributeValue("subset");
// determine if its an exclude subset
if(subset.charAt(O)
{
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exclude = true;
subset = subset.substring(1);
}
room = m-muc .getChatRoom(to.getNode());
st = subset.split("/");
if ((st!=null) && room!=null )
{
processed = true;
// Iterate through all room occupants
for(int i = O;i<st.length;i++) {
m_temp = message.createCopy();
occupants = room.getOccupants(;
for(MUCRole occupant : occupants){
if(occupant.getNickname().equals(st[i]))
{
inroomto =
occupant.getUserAddress();
break;
}
// send to everyone in the subset
if(inroomto != null){
m_temp.setTo(inroomto);
m_temp.setFrom(new
JID(node,domain,resource));
messageRouter.route(m-temp);
inroomto = null;
}
}
}
}
return processed;
}
Listing 7.11: Processing subset messages on Openfire
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Openfire uses a plugin mechanism which allowed us to implement these changes on
top of the existing XMPP code for Openfire. If multiple plugins catch the signal,
the plugins are executed on the messages in order of priority, which is defined when
registering the plugin. If the message is thrown away in this subset plugin, then it
will not be accessible for later plugins. Plugins always run in a priority lower than the
native Openfire code, however. Figure 7-4 shows how a subset command message from
Pidgin uses the handler function to attach the subset attribute. The Openfire server
then uses that attribute to route the message to the appropriate user membership.
2. Send subset message to server
XMPP chat message
XMPP client
Isubset alkelbob sample Input
1. Input text to Pidgin
Figure 7-4: Subset message creation and routing on XMPP client and server
7.5 Evaluation and Conclusions
These XMPP chat messages were deployed on a military exercise called CAPSTONE
II [6]. The exercise contained a disadvantaged network with low-bandwidth, high-
latency links. Each site had users connected to a geographically local server and
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servers connected to each other over the disadvantaged network. Approximately 30
users exercised the chat system and sent approximately 2500 messages. The ge2e ele-
ments were used to encapsulate group secure communications. Unfortunately, subsets
were not used during the exercise because the implementation was not complete by
the exercise start date, but functionally worked in isolated testing where users sent
subset messages to a local server and a local chatroom.
We implemented a group security ge2e element and associated j abber-ge2e-encrypt
and j abber-ge2e-decrypt signals to allow for group encryption schemes to interface
with XMPP. This creates an extensible mechanism for using secure group communi-
cations on any XMPP supported application.
We also created an optimization for XMPP and multi-user chat to eliminate re-
dundant message transmission. The implementation on the XMPP client and server
may reduce XMPP overhead for secure group communications in situations where
large messages need to be sent to a subset of the membership of a chatroom.
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Chapter 8
Conclusions
In this thesis, we investigated methods for optimizing and implementing standardized
cryptographic message formats for the use in disadvantaged networks. Both methods,
ZLIB-compression with a static, preplaced dictionary and CMS Lite, reduce message-
size overhead of CMS messages. The former uses generic data compression and is easy
to implement. CMS Lite implements domain-specific, hand-crafted compression, and
as such can potentially outperform the generic approach; on the other hand, imple-
menting CMS Lite is incomparably harder. A promising middle-ground for future
research is to combine the two approaches: process CMS messages to consolidate all
the formatting and configuration parts into one section and all the random, ciphertext
parts into the other, and run zlib with a preplaced dictionary over the former part;
then on the deflation side, reverse the process.
8.1 What I Learned
While working on this thesis project, I learned more about C programming and the
use of GNU tools such as gdb and Autotools. I examined the Pidgin and OpenSSL
source code and developed extensions using the CMS and ASN.1 APIs in OpenSSL
while creating plugins for Pidgin. I developed better coding practices and became
proficient in the vim and ctags text editor tools for programming in Linux. Finally,
I freshened up my knowledge of I4ThX by writing this thesis.
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Appendix A
CMS ASN.1 Library Listing
ASN1_CHOICE(CMSLiteData) = {
ASN1_IMP(CMSLiteData, params.signedParams,
CMSSigned-params, 0),
ASN1_IMP(CMSLiteData, params.envelopedParams,
CMSEnveloped-params , 1),
ASN1_IMP(CMSLiteData, params.digestedParams,
CMSDigested-params, 2),
ASN1_IMP(CMSLiteData, params.encryptedParams,
CMSEncrypted-params, 3),
ASN1_IMP(CMSLiteData, params.authenticatedParams,
CMSAuthenticated_params, 4),
ASN1_IMP(CMSLiteData, params.compressedParams
CMS.Compressed-params ,5)
} ASN1_CHOICEEND(CMSLiteData)
Listing A.1: CMS LiteData
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Listing A.2: CMS Signed-params : SignedData
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ASN1_NDEFSEQUENCE(CMSSigned-params) = {
ASN1_SIMPLE(CMSSigned-params, version, LONG),
ASN1_SIMPLE(CMSSigned-params, contentType , LONG),
ASN1_SIMPLE(CMSSigned-params, eContent,
ASN1_OCTETSTRING),
ASN1_SETOF(CMSSigned-params , signerInfos,
CMSSignerInfo-params)
} ASN1_NDEFSEQUENCEEND(CMSSigned-params)
ASN1_SEQUENCE(CMSSignerInfo-params) = {
ASN1_SIMPLE(CMSSignerInfo-params, version, LONG),
ASN1_SIMPLE(CMSSignerInfo-params, sidHash, LONG),
ASN1_SIMPLE(CMSSignerInfo-params, type, LONG),
ASN1_SIMPLE(CMSSignerInfo-params, parameter, LONG),
ASN1_IMPSETOFOPT(CMSSignerInfo-params, signedAttrs,
X509_ATTRIBUTE,
0),
ASN1_SIMPLE(CMSSignerInfo-params, signature,
ASN1_OCTETSTRING)
} ASN1_SEQUENCEEND(CMSSignerInfo-params)
ASN1_NDEFSEQUENCE(CMSEnveloped-params) = {
ASN1_SIMPLE(CMS.Enveloped-params, version, LONG),
ASN1_SET.OF(CMSEnveloped-params, recipientInfos,
CMSRecipient-params),
ASN1_SIMPLE(CMSEnveloped-params , parameter, LONG),
ASN1_SIMPLE(CMSEnveloped-params, encryptAlg, X509_ALGOR),
ASN1_IMPOPT(CMS.Enveloped-params, eContent,
ASN1_0CTETSTRINGNDEF, 0),
} ASN1_NDEFSEQUENCEEND(CMSEnveloped-params)
ASN1.CHOICE(CMSRecipient-params) = {
ASN1_SIMPLE(CMSRecipient-params, d.ktp,
CMSKeyTransParams),
ASN1IMP(CMSRecipient-params, d.kap, CMSKeyAgreeParams,
1),
ASN1_IMP(CMSRecipient-params, d.kekp, CMSKEKParams, 2),
ASN1_IMP(CMSRecipient-params, d.pwdp, CMSPasswordParams,
3)
} ASN1_CHOICEEND(CMSRecipient-params)
ASN1.SEQUENCE(CMS.KeyTransParams) = {
ASN1_SIMPLE(CMSKeyTransParams, version, LONG),
ASN1_SIMPLE(CMSKeyTransParams, type, LONG),
ASN1_SIMPLE(CMSKeyTransParams, sidHash, LONG),
ASN1_SIMPLE(CMSKeyTransParams, encryptedKey,
ASN1.OCTETSTRING)
} ASN1_SEQUENCE.END(CMSKeyTransParams)
ASN1_SEQUENCE(CMSKeyAgreeParams) = {
ASN1_SIMPLE(CMSKeyAgreeParams, version, LONG),
ASN1_EXP(CMSKeyAgreeParams, originator,
CMSOriginatorIdentifierOrKey , 0),
ASNIEXPOPT(CMSKeyAgreeParams, ukm, ASN1_OCTETSTRING,
1),
ASN1_SIMPLE(CMSKeyAgreeParams, keyEncryptionAlgorithm,
ASN1.INTEGER),
ASN1_SEQUENCEOF(CMSKeyAgreeParams,
recipientEncryptedKeys,
CMSRecipientEncryptedKey)
} ASN1_SEQUENCEEND(CMSKeyAgreeParams)
Listing A.3: CMS Enveloped-params : EnvelopedData
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ASN1_SEQUENCE(CMSKEKParams) = {
ASN1_SIMPLE(CMSKEKParams, version, LONG),
ASN1_SIMPLE(CMSKEKParams, kekid, CMSKEKIdentifier),
ASN1_SIMPLE(CMSKEKParams, keyEncryptionAlgorithm,
ASNIINTEGER),
ASN1.SIMPLE(CMSKEKParams, encryptedKey,
ASN1_OCTETSTRING)
} ASN1_SEQUENCEEND(CMSKEKParams)
ASN1_SEQUENCE(CMSPasswordParams) = {
ASN1.SIMPLE(CMSPasswordParams, version, LONG),
ASN1_SIMPLE(CMSPasswordParams, keyParam, LONG),
ASN1_SIMPLE(CMSPasswordParams, encryptedKey,
ASN1_OCTETSTRING)
} ASN1.SEQUENCEEND(CMSPasswordParams)
Listing A.4: EnvelopedData continued...
ASN1_NDEFSEQUENCE(CMSDigested-params) = {
ASN1.SIMPLE(CMSDigested-params, version, LONG),
ASN1_SIMPLE(CMSDigested-params, parameter, LONG),
ASN1.SIMPLE(CMSDigested-params, eContent,
ASN1_OCTET.STRING),
ASN1_SIMPLE(CMSDigested-params, digest,
ASNIOCTETSTRING)
} ASN1_NDEFSEQUENCEEND(CMSDigested-params)
Listing A.5: CMS Digested-params : DigestedData
ASN1_NDEFSEQUENCE(CMSCompressed-params) = {
ASN1.SIMPLE(CMSCompressed-params , version, LONG),
ASN1_SIMPLE(CMSCompressedparams, parameter, LONG),
ASNISIMPLE(CMSCompressed-params, eContent,
ASN1_OCTETSTRING),
ASN1.OPT(CMSCompressed-params, dictionaryDigest,
ASNIOCTETSTRING)
} ASN1_NDEFSEQUENCE.END(CMSCompressed-params)
Listing A.6: CMS Compressed-params : CompressedData
ASN1.NDEF.SEQUENCE(CMSEncrypted-params) = {
ASNiSIMPLE(CMSEncrypted.params, version, LONG),
ASN1_SIMPLE(CMSEncrypted-params, contentType , LONG),
ASN1_SIMPLE(CMSEncrypted-params, encryptAlg, X509_ALGOR),
ASN1_SIMPLE(CMSEncrypted-params, eContent,
ASN1_OCTETSTRING)
} ASNINDEFSEQUENCEEND(CMSEncrypted-params)
Listing A.7: CMS Encrypted-params : EncryptedData
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Appendix B
CMS Optimizations Data
[Test J SignedData Size EnvelopedData Size
Original CMS Size 455.8 463
Worst Case Conditions (ZLIB no dictionary) 427.6 463
ZLIB Best Dictionary 341.2 341.4
Best Case Conditions (ZLIB repeated) 316.8 314.5
CMS Lite 410 358
Table B.1: Summary results of all optimizations on CMS
Dictionary JSigned [Enveloped [Digested [Compressed Encrypted
Original Message 526.8 455.8 63 82 69
CMS Shortened Strings 355.8 380.6 44 65 55
CMS Full Structures 356.6 358 49 39 38
Strings + Certs 336 361.2 42 64 56
Full + Certs 341.2 341.4 38 53 38
Strings + SignerlDs + Certs 352.4 376.8 47 67 59
Full + SignerlDs + Certs 361.8 360.2 40 55 40
Table B.2: Dictionary ZLIB compression results
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Dictionary JSigned lEnveloped Digested Compressed Encrypted
Original Message 270.8 199.8 43 82 69
CMS Shortened Strings 99.8 124.6 24 65 55
CMS Full Structures 100.6 102 29 38 39
Strings + Certs 80 105.2 22 64 56
Full + Certs 85.2 85.4 18 53 38
Strings + SignerlDs + Certs 96.4 120.8 27 67 59
Full + SignerlDs + Certs 105.8 104.2 20 55 40
Table B.3: Dictionary ZLIB overhead compression results
CMS Structure I Original CMS CMS Lite
SignedData 526.8 410
EnvelopedData 455.8 358
DigestedData 63 34
CompressedData 82 72
EncryptedData 69 50
Table B.4: CMS Lite optimization results
CMS Structure Original CMS [CMS Lite
SignedData 270.8 154
EnvelopedData 199.8 102
DigestedData 43 14
CompressedData 82 72
EncryptedData 69 50
Table B.5: CMS Lite overhead optimization results
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